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COMMENT
WHOSE STATUTE IS IT ANYWAY?: WHY AND
HOW COURTS SHOULD USE PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS WHEN
INTERPRETING FEDERAL STATUTES
Fifty years ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter asserted confidently that "no
one will gainsay that the function [of a court] in construing a statute is to
ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is
to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature."1 This classic formulation of "legislative supremacy," 2 as the touchstone for statutory interpretation, has a long tradition in American law.3
Over the past fifty years, however, the relationship between Congress
and the President in developing legislation has become more complex.4
Consequently, Congress has relied increasingly on administrative agencies to formulate national policy.5 While the Supreme Court has announced that courts should defer to reasonable interpretations of statutes
1. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, Lecture before
the New York City Bar Association (Mar. 18, 1947), reprinted in 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
533 (1947).
2. "Legislative supremacy" embodies the concept that in interpreting a statute, a
court merely gives effect to the supreme will of the democratically elected legislature. See
Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1129, 1132 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283 (1989) (indicating that legislative supremacy is grounded
in the notion that courts must defer to legislatures except when exercising judicial review);
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319-20
(1989) (inquiring as to "how much, if any, policymaking discretion [the legislative
supremacy model] leaves for those interpreting and implementing the legislature's
statutes").
3. See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 802-43 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (noting that the most prevalent
understanding of statutory construction is that "judges are the agents or servants of the
legislature"). Indeed, Professor Sunstein notes that this formulation was expressed by
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Paulina'sCargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
52, 60 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) ("In construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the
duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature.").
4. See infra Part II.B.1.
5. See infra Part I.A.2.
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by administrative agencies, 6 which are under presidential control, an unresolved question has arisen with regard to what, if any, deference courts
should afford to interpretations of statutes made by the President himself.
Since 1990, the question has been presented to courts more frequently7
because Presidents Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and William Clinton
have all issued statements interpreting bills they have signed into law.8
This practice of aggressively issuing interpretive signing statements departs from what was traditionally a largely ceremonial use of signing
statements to congratulate members of Congress for passing legislation of
which the President approved or to instruct the executive branch on the
legislation's execution. 9
Prior to the 1980s, Presidents interpreted a law at its signing only in
isolated cases."0 In 1830, in conjunction with a bill appropriating revenue
for road building, President Andrew Jackson sent a message to the House
of Representatives interpreting the authorization as limited to roadbuilding within the Michigan territory." Similarly, in 1842, when President
John 'Tyler signed a bill about which he had constitutional and policy misgivings, he issued a statement expressing his understanding under which
the law would be constitutional.' 2 To accompany his signing of an 1876
river and harbor appropriations bill, President Ulysses Grant issued a
statement declaring that he would not allow expenditures on projects that
6. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
7. See infra Part I.E.2 (discussing cases using presidential signing statements).
8. See infra Part I.D (describing and discussing the signing statements of Presidents
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton).
9. See Frank B. Cross, The ConstitutionalLegitimacy and Significance of Presidential
"Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 209, 209 (1988) (discussing President Reagan's

use of signing statements as being more substantive than the typical "photo session" at the
signing of a bill). Signing statements are distinguished from Presidential documents regarding a bill prior to enactment. See Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The
President's Place in "Legislative History," 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 403-13 (1990) (arguing

that Presidential documents, including messages, proposals, and legislative drafts, are relevant to statutory interpretation because of the President's legislative role).
10. See Walter Dellinger, Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the
President,48 ARK. L. REV. 333, 339, 342 (1995) [hereinafter PresidentialSigning State-

ments] (noting that there are isolated examples of interpretive signing statements if one
understands an interpretive signing statement to be one that addresses the legal and constitutional questions presented by the legislation).
11. See Cross, supra note 9, at 210. When the House reconvened, it issued a report
asserting that Jackson's statement had in effect constituted an item veto. See Louis
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

ed. 1991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL

128 (3rd

CONFLICTS].

12. See Cross, supra note 9, at 210. In response, the House convened a select committee which issued a report protesting the President's actions. See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS, supra note 11, at 128.
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were not in the national interest, despite the bill's appropriations for local
interests. 13 Finally, President Harry Truman, in signing anti-racketeering
legislation, defined a term which had not been defined in the legislation.' 4
The Reagan administration transformed this largely ceremonial practice into an overtly political maneuver by using signing statements to
present the administration's interpretation of ambiguous or controversial

laws.15 The Bush administration,' 6 and thus far the Clinton administra-

tion,

7

have continued this practice. In the 1980s, the Reagan administra-

tion instituted a policy of routinely issuing interpretive signing
statements. 18 Members of that administration defended the use of inter-

pretive signing statements by asserting a need to strengthen presidential
control over the vast administrative bureaucracy. 19 In effect, however,
signing statements containing agency instructions have at least two audi13. See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 11, at 129.
14. See Cross, supra note 9, at 211 (quoting 1947 PUB. PAPERS 243). President Truman
insisted that the meaning of "compensable labor" in the act should be "construed liberally," an interpretation arguably in furtherance of President Truman's policy of protecting
labor interests. Id. This signing statement was later used by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658 (4th Cir.
1969), to support its construction of an undefined statutory term. See Wirtz, 413 F.2d at
661; see also infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing the court's use of President Truman's signing statement).
15. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Last Word: Meese Pickpockets Congress, NEW REPUBLIC,
Nov. 3, 1986, at 13-14 (arguing that the courts "ought to reject any notion of giving interpretive weight to presidential signing statements as a flagrant interference in congressional
prerogatives"); see also William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of PresidentialLegislative History:
A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 704 (1991) (arguing that President Reagan used "signing statements to resolve politically sensitive issues and to undermine the statutory structure");
infra Part I.D.1 (discussing the Reagan Administration's use of signing statements).
16. See infra Part I.D.2 (discussing the Bush Administration's use of signing
statements).
17. See infra Part I.D.3 (discussing the Clinton Administration's use of signing
statements).
18. See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing Reagan Administration's use of signing
statements).
19. See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. Rv. 219, 229 (1993). Professor Herz identifies signing statements as the
fourth mechanism Presidents can use to control or influence executive agency statutory
interpretation. See id. He identifies three other mechanisms. See id. at 220-29. First are
Executive Orders requiring Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of proposed
rules and policy documents. See id. at 221-22. President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291
requiring OMB review was adopted nearly verbatim by President Clinton as Executive
Order 12,866. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994). The second mechanism Professor Herz identifies is the President's Council on
Competitiveness, which under Presidents Reagan and Bush was the final executive regulatory review, and succeeded in derailing agency policies inconsistent with those administrations. See Herz, supra, at 223. President Clinton subsequently abolished the Council. See
id. at 223 n.23. Finally, Professor Herz points out that Presidents can ensure consistent
legal interpretations among agencies by requiring agencies to consult with and be bound by
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ences: the agency receiving the instructions, and the courts interpreting
the intent of Congress and reviewing administrative agency action. 20 A
number of courts have given interpretive weight to presidential signing
statements to assist them in determining the meaning of federal statutes. 21 Presidential intent, therefore, has emerged as a species of legislative history. If the court's role in construing statutes is to determine the
intent behind the legislation, the question then becomes the status of the
President's intent. The answer depends upon the court's view of the President's role in enacting legislation, and upon whether his intent matters.
This Comment argues that the President's intent is, in some circumstances, relevant to determining the intent of the legislation. In Part I,
this Comment discusses the separation of powers principles relevant to
the making and administering of federal statutes, including historical
changes in the making, administering, and interpreting of federal statutes.
Next, this Comment examines the validity of using legislative history to
interpret statutes. This Comment describes the kinds of signing statements Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have issued and discusses
the critical response to the notion of an interpretive value to presidential
intent. This Comment then describes how courts use signing statements.
In Part III, this Comment suggests what principles should guide the
courts' use of presidential signing statements in interpreting federal statutes. Finally, this Comment applies the proposed model to critique existing court use of signing statements.
I.

THE THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
INTERPRETIVE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS

A.
1.

Separation of Powers Models

Separation of Powers Principlesin the Making of Federal Statutes

To determine how a court should treat a presidential interpretation of a
statute, it is first necessary to adopt an understanding of separation of
powers.2 2 The Constitution divides the delegated governing powers
Attorney General opinions. See id. at 226-229; see also infra Part I.D.1 (discussing the
Reagan Administration's use of signing statements).
20. See Herz, supra note 19, at 229. Professor Herz notes that although the Presidential practice of using signing statements to put a particular "'spin' on legislation ... is
usually perceived (and criticized) as an effort to plant legislative history for later judicial
discovery, it might be aimed at agencies rather than courts." Id.; see also infra Part I.D.1
(discussing the Reagan administration's rationale for its signing statement strategy).
21. See infra Part I.E.2. (quantifying and discussing the courts' use of Presidential sign-

ing statements to construe legislation).
22. This is necessary because "[a]ny theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. It must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institu-
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among three separate branches of the federal government.2 3 Separationof-powers disputes revolve around the constitutional dividing lines between the powers of each branch. 4 Throughout much of the nation's
history, the Supreme Court has embraced a formalistic25 separation of

powers model prohibiting each branch from exercising any power of another branch. 26 Recently, however, the Court has adopted a more func-

tional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that inform interpretation." Jerry
Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988).
23. First, the Constitution vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted" in the Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Second, the Constitution vests the executive power in the
President. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Finally, the Constitution vests the judicial power in
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24. See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUtF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 110
(1996) ("[S]eparation of powers doctrine has long struggled with the problem of limits to
Congress' discretion to structure and empower the other two branches."); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 430-52 (1987)
(analyzing the rationale behind the Constitution's creation of three branches of government, each charged with overlapping duties and aimed at achieving a balance between
governmental efficiency, and the need to confine authority within each branch). It is generally accepted that we no longer have a clear theoretical understanding of the separation
of powers. See Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation"for the Separation of Powers:
The Federalist Papers as PoliticalNarrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 454 (1996). Professor
Nourse suggests that our contradictory understanding of separation of powers in which
"[wle are quite satisfied to say that governmental powers are separate and shared, departments distinct and overlapping, functions autonomous and interdependent" is a result of a
basic misunderstanding of separation of powers. Id. at 447. She argues that separation of
powers intends to safeguard our government against tyranny by separating political power
rather than legal authority. See id. at 449.
25. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1522-27 (1991) (discussing "formalist" approaches to separation of powers
questions).
26. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (invalidating, on separation of
powers grounds, a statute which constrained the power of the President to remove executive officials). In Myers, a statute required Senate approval for the appointment and removal of first, second, and third class postmasters. See id. at 107. The Court reasoned that
no branch has implied powers to exercise a function which the Constitution assigns to
another branch because "the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the
branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and
the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires." Id. at 116. Thus, because the Constitution vested the executive power in the
President, and because the Constitution did not constrain the President's power to remove
administrative officers, Congress could not constrain the President's power. See id. at 128.
Justice Brandeis in dissent argued for a more functional approach: "The separation of the
powers of government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in
some measure, dependent upon the others, as it left each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial." Id. at 291 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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tionalist 2 7 model which acknowledges some 28sharing of constitutional
powers between the branches of government.
At present, the Court's analysis of separation of powers issues consid-

ers whether sharing powers undermines the constitutional powers of each
branch, and whether there are encroachment or aggrandizement concerns.29 This change first appeared in Buckley v. Valeo, 3° where the

Court recognized that a total separation of powers would prevent the nation from being able to govern itself.31 Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson,32
the Court focused on whether the legislation in issue impermissibly undermined executive branch power.3 3 Further, in Mistretta v. United

27. See Brown, supra note 25, at 1522, 1527-29 (discussing "functionalist" approaches
to separation of powers questions).
28. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (describing the Court's recent separation of powers jurisprudence). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding
that a one-house legislative veto provision was unconstitutional). In Chadha, the Court
found that the statutory provision which enabled either House of Congress to veto a deportation decision made by the Attorney General violated the Constitution's "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for exercising the legislative power because it circumvented the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. Id.
at 951. The Court viewed the Constitution's division of powers as a command that each
branch, "as nearly as possible ... confine itself to its assigned responsibility." Id.
29. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's recent approaches to separation of powers issues).
30. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (holding unconstitutional that portion of a statute which
delegated tasks of an executive nature to a non-executive officer).
31. See id. at 120-21. The Court argued that:
Our inquiry... start[s] on the common ground in the recognition of the intent of
the Framers that the powers of the three great branches of the National Government be largely separate from one another.
Yet it is also clear ...

that the Constitution by no means contemplates total

separation of each of these three essential branches of Government. The President is a participant in the lawmaking process by virtue of his authority to veto
bills enacted by Congress. The Senate is a participant in the appointive process
by virtue of its authority to refuse to confirm persons nominated to office by the
President. The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of
powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic
sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
Id.
32. 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (holding that the special court's appointment of an
independent counsel exercising executive functions court did not interfere with the President's executive power).
33. See id. at 694-95; see also Nourse, supra note 24, at 515 (noting that the Court
conducted a "classically 'functional' analysis" in reaching its conclusion in Morrison).
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States,34 the Court noted it would uphold statutory provisions that commingle each branches' functions as long as such provisions do not encroach on the powers of one branch, or aggrandize one branch at the
expense of another."
The Constitution establishes the process by which federal law is
made.36 Under this scheme, the President's role in setting national policy
is to recommend legislation to Congress,37 and then either to sign bills
into law 38 or to veto them. 39 In some contexts, the Supreme Court has
34. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the inclusion of federal judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Commission, charged with formulating sentencing guidelines
that would have the force of law, did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers).
35. See id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The Constitution provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall ... proceed to

reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree
to pass the Bill, it shall be sent ... to the other House, by which it shall likewise

be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law.
Id.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl.
3. Under the original formulation of the clause, the
President had the option to recommend legislation. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081 (1989). But when the wording was changed from
"may" to "shall" at the Constitutional convention, the Recommendation Clause became a
Presidential duty. See id. at 2085. However, unlike the Senate's duty to ratify or not ratify
treaties that the President presents to it, the Congress is under no obligation to do anything
about the President's recommendations. See id. at 2082. Professor Sidak concludes that
President George Washington and the first Congress interpreted the Constitution to require the President to have an active role in legislation. See id at 2085. Presidents have
fulfilled their responsibility to recommend legislation from the beginning of the Republic.
Thus, during President Washington's administration, Congress directed Secretary of the
Treasury Alexander Hamilton to essentially draft legislation establishing a national bank.
See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 52 (1972).
The judiciary has also drafted legislation. For example, Justice Story prepared the bill
which reorganized the federal courts in 1816. See id. Although executive officials are no
longer given access to the floor of either House, they do testify before legislative committees. See id. at 53. Today that responsibility has grown so that between 50% and 80% of
all laws originate in the executive branch. See id. at 54.
38. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
39. See id. By threatening a veto, the President can influence legislation. See Cross,
supra note 9, at 216 & n.48. Statistics confirm that the veto is a powerful statutory weapon.
See Louis FISHER, THE POLrrIcs OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXEcuTIVE 21
(3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter SHARED POWER]. Between 1789 and 1992, Presidents vetoed a
total of 2497 bills (1442 regular vetoes and 1055 pocket vetoes). See id. at 22. One hundred and three of those vetoes were overridden. See id. Since pocket vetoes are absolute,
the percentage of bills overridden is 7.1%. See id. Mr. Fisher notes, however, that these
statistics can be misleading because if the focus is on "nationally significant legislation ...
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asserted that this is the limit on the President's legislative role.4' The
President's legislative role has expanded, however, as a result of congres-

sional delegation of legislative power, 41 an implied power to issue regula44 as well as the President's
42
4 and executive
43
45 Thus, orders,
tions,
albeit limited, legislathis active,
lobby for legislation.
ability toproclamations,
Congress is more successful with its override efforts." Id. at 21; see also Harold H. Bruff,
Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv. 207, 220 (1984):
The President's veto power is a more potent check on faction than is the bicameral structure of Congress, because the President's national constituency makes
his calculus of the merits of a bill different from that of any congressman ...
Moreover, the mere threat of a veto can raise the size of the coalition necessary to
push a bill through Congress and can affect the bill's substance.
Id. Additionally, the President can use the threat of a veto to affect the amendment process. See Cross, supra note 9, at 215-16.
40. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (noting that
the President's legislative role is limited to "the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad"). See generally Bruff, supra note 39, at 220 ("The President's participation in the legislative process, both in proposing and supporting legislation
and in exercising the veto power, dampens faction and increases the stability of
legislation.").
41. See infra Part I.A.2. (discussing separation of powers principles in the administration of statutes).
42. See FISHER, SHARED POWER, supra note 39, at 24. Executive officials issue rules
and regulations that are binding on the executive branch to implement Congressional delegations of authority. See id. For these rules and regulations to be valid, they must be
consistent with the statutory authority upon which they are based. See Manhattan Gen.
Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (noting that a regulation which cannot be reconciled with the statute upon which it was based "is a mere nullity"). In practice,
the political discretion the President assumes through this power varies with the specificity
of the statute. See FISHER, SHARED POWER, supra note 39, at 24-25.
43. Although Presidential proclamations are generally not legislative in character, they
have been used substantively on occasion. See FISHER, SHARED POWER, supra note 39, at
25. For example, President Carter used a Presidential Proclamation to impose import quotas on television parts. See Proclamation No. 4759, 3 C.F.R. 62-63 (1980). The courts have
used the same analysis in this context as they have in determining whether an executive
branch rule or regulation is valid. See United States v. Yoshida Int'l, 526 F.2d 560, 584
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding that President Nixon's proclamation imposing a 10% surcharge
on imported articles as consistent with statutory authority).
44. Executive orders are customarily directed towards the President's subordinates, as
opposed to proclamations, which are generally directed towards the public. See William D.
Neighbors, Comment, PresidentialLegislation By Executive Order, 37 U. COLO. L. REv.
105, 106 (1964). Executive orders must be based on constitutional or statutory authority.
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585; see also Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and
Orders: The Problem of PresidentialLegislation, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (1976)
(arguing that courts generally uphold executive orders despite their occasional questionable constitutionality). The signing statement has emerged as another mechanism through
which the President can assert this power. See Herz, supra note 19, at 229.
45. See FISHER, SHARED POWER, supra note 39, at 38. Mr. Fisher notes that the President's power in this regard depends upon both the institutional strength of the presidency
as well as the personal strength of the particular President. See id.at 38-45. He argues that
the institutional strengthening of the presidency began with the establishment of congres-
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tive role may render the President's views, as evidenced in signing statements, relevant to judicial interpretation.46
2. Separation of Powers Principlesin the Administration of Statutes
Although the Constitution vests the legislative power in the Con-

gress,47 Congress may delegate some portion of its legislative power
through lawmaking as long as it does so pursuant to a valid standard and
the power is delegated only to government officials. 48 Many laws delegate authority to executive administrative agencies, 49 whose role is to implement the statute. 50 These executive agencies are under the control of

the President. 51 In general, the President asserts his power over executive agencies through executive orders directed towards his subordinates." For the President to execute the law and for the agencies to
administer the law, they must interpret the law.5 3 When a court reviews
sional liaison positions in the Executive Office of the President as well as the executive
agencies. See id. at 38.
46. See infra Part I.E.1 (discussing criticism of interpretive use of signing statements).
47. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
48. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-24 (1989) (holding
that a statute authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to establish user fees to recover
the costs of administering pipeline safety programs was not an unconstitutional delegation
of Congress's power to tax, because Congress often legislates taxes "with remarkable specificity" and because the delegation was to a government official); see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTs, supra note 11, at 114 (noting that the executive and the legislative
branches of government now exercise much of Congress's original legislative power).
49. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7
(1993).
50. See id. at 435.
51. The generally accepted constitutional authority for the President's supervision
over the administrative bureaucracy is the Take Care Clause. See id. at 562. The Take
Care Clause provides that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Pursuant to this power, the President has the power to
instruct his officers as to how the law is to be executed. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note
49, at 562; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992) (noting that
under the unitary executive theory, the Take Care Clause together with the Vesting Clause
of Article II "creat[es] a hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct control of the President"). Unitary executive theorists conclude that since the President himself has all of the executive power, he has full authority to direct, control, and supervise
inferior officers and the agencies in their exercise of discretionary executive power. See id.
The Vesting Clause provides that "[tihe executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
52. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 49, at 562; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional sources of the President's authority to issue executive orders).
53. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) ("Interpreting a law enacted by
Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law.").
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an agency interpretation of a law that is ambiguous as to the issue
presented, the principle announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.5 4 requires the court to defer to a reasonable
agency interpretation when congressional intent is unclear.5" The Chevron analysis therefore requires the court to first determine whether there

is any ambiguity that would require the court to consult the agency's interpretation.5 6 The ramification of this principle is that where a statute is
ambiguous, the court may defer to Presidential intent as expressed in an
57
executive order or signing statement.

54. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
55. See id. at 842-43. Chevron requires the court to engage in a two-step analysis. See
id. First, the court must ask whether Congress specifically addressed the issue. See id. at
842. If Congress did, then the court should interpret the statute without reference to the
agency's statutory construction. See id. at 842-43. Second, if Congress did not directly
address the issue, the court must determine whether the agency's interpretation "is based
on a permissible construction of the statute," rather than construe the statute itself. Id. at
843. To decide whether the agency's interpretation is permissible, the court does not need
to "conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if
the question had initially arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 843 n.11.
56. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DUKE L.J. 371, 373. Judge Starr notes that the "overlooked side to Chevron [is] its call for
a return to traditional principles of statutory interpretation. After Chevron, the courts are
not to begin by examining the agency's interpretation; instead, the courts are to look to the
statute itself to ascertain what Congress intended." Id.
57. See Chevron, 476 U.S. at 865-66 (depicting one of the rationales for the Court's
holding as the President's electoral accountability to the people). Justice Stevens wrote:
[Ain agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices.
Id. at 865; see also Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 277, 308 (1990) (indicating that under the Chevron principle, "the executive's interpretation trumps that of the court").
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B.

485

Separation of Powers Principlesin the Interpretationof
FederalStatutes

1. Statutory Interpretation Over Time
This is an "age of statutes."58 As the size of the federal government
has grown, so has the number of federal statutes. 59 As the scope of fed-

eral statutes has broadened, such statutes have become increasingly complex and specialized.6" The majority of these statutes delegate authority

to administrative agencies, which "enjoy an interpretive role by the very
nature of their creation."'" Indeed, during this century, the role of federal courts increasingly has been to interpret federal statutes. 62 As a re-

sult of the complexity of federal statutes and the interpretive role of

58. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3 (1995). Today, legislatures are the primary force determining public policy through the enactment of statutes
that accomplish a variety of goals. See id. Foremost among of these goals are the redistribution of wealth through society and the regulation of the market. See id.
59. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982)
(noting that today the primary source of law in America are statutes enacted by legislatures); GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) (noting that between 1900
and 1950, an "orgy of statute making" resulted in more substantive law being made
through statutes than through common law principles).
60. See Starr, supra note 56, at 372 (describing "labyrinthine statutes that govern
highly technical matters beyond the expertise of a generalist judiciary"). Judge Starr notes
that statutes apply to the regulation of technologies that did not exist when the statute was
enacted. See id. According to Judge Wald, judges may not always understand the complexities and technicalities of statutes. See Wald, supra note 57, at 301; see also Frank P.
Grad, The Ascendancy of Legislation: Legal Problem Solving in Our Time, 9

DALHOUSIE

L.J. 228, 251 (1985) (suggesting that "programmatic legislation," which was first enacted
during the New Deal, is the dominant form of legislation today). Professor Grad defines
programmatic legislation as that which creates a governmental program, usually by establishing an agency and assigning it a task, or by assigning a task to an already existing
agency. See id. at 251-52. Often the delegation to the agency is broad, thereby requiring
the agency to fill in the details of the mandate. See id. at 252. Professor Grad notes that
when a legislature regulates an entire field, the legislation will be especially detailed and
complex. See id.

61. Starr, supra note 56, at 372. Judge Starr argues that agencies in fact decide questions of law in the process of carrying out the tasks they have been assigned. See id.
62. See id. at 371. In comparison with the number of statutes it passes today, Congress
was relatively inactive for the most part of the nineteenth century. JAMES WILLARD
HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 10 (1982). Professor Hurst notes that during that period, Congress enacted few statutes implementing bold programming to attain broad policy
objectives. See id. Rather, most statutes addressed highly particularized matters. See id.
As a result, common law judges generally engaged in judicial lawmaking rather than statutory construction. See GILMORE, supra note 59, at 35-36. However, when resolving federal
issues, federal courts have largely dealt with statutory issues because of limited federal
common law. See Grad, supra note 60, at 246.
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agencies through their rulemaking powers, federal courts have given deference to agency interpretations of law.63
2.

Separation of Powers Theory

Once a statute is enacted, it is the judiciary's role to interpret and apply

it. 6 4

Language itself can be ambiguous, and statutes, because they often
are the result of compromise, are particularly prone to ambiguity. 65 Because it is not the judiciary's role to set national policy, 66 legislative his67
tory serves as a limit guiding the judiciary's interpretation of statutes.
Although American courts traditionally followed the English practice of
not using legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutes, this practice
has changed during the twentieth century. 68 As a result, most courts ex63. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Chevron principle).
Judge Starr interprets Chevron to mean that although courts are required to defer to administrative decisions, they must begin their analysis by looking at the statute itself. See
Starr, supra note 56, at 373.
64. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.").
65. See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380,
380. Judge Mikva notes that the reason that statutes "tend to have diffuse and ambiguous
meanings" is that "[lt]he consensus that is reached [by the 535 "prima donnas" in Congress]
to get a bill passed in the first place is a tenuous and confused one." Id. Furthermore,
these compromises may be expressed in statutory ambiguities that allow members to read
the statute "the way they wish." MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 779-80 (noting that this
phenomenon reveals "the very practical side of the legislative process"); see also Douglas
W. Kmiec, Of Balkanized Empires and Cooperative Allies: A Bicentennial Essay on the
Separation of Powers, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 73, 73 (1987) [hereinafter Balkanized Empires]
(stating that broad delegations of congressional authority to administrative agencies leave
the President and the courts no choice but to make law).
66. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional sources of
judicial power); see also, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
549 (1935) (noting that it is not for the Court to articulate the economic advantages or
disadvantages of a system of federally imposed labor standards); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (noting that the courts do not have the constitutional authority to
declare policy or to override legislatively declared policy).
67. See Wald, supra note 57, at 306. Judge Wald notes that it is the responsibility of
federal judges to "subordinate [their] wishes to the will of Congress." Id. at 281. She
advocates the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation because without it, "the
door is inevitably left open for judicial assumptions, speculation, preferences, and notions
of 'sound public policy"' when judges interpret in light of the "context," "purpose," or
"object and purpose" of a statute. Id. at 304. Judge Starr, however, argues that the use of
legislative history achieves the opposite result because "[i]n using legislative materials, the
courts create winners and losers in the legislative process." Starr, supra note 56, at 376.
68. See Starr, supra note 56, at 373-74; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 868 (1992) (arguing that in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, judges did not need to look at legislative
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amine legislative intent or purpose 69 when interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions.7 ° It is generally accepted that legislative history is a valid
source of intent or purpose.7 1 Thus, when ambiguity permits more than

one reasonable reading of a statute, courts may depart from the statutory
language and consider its legislative history. 72 Legislative history encompasses the reasons the bill was introduced, the legislative consideration of
the bill, and what happened after the enacted bill was initially applied and
history because there were not as many statutes as there are today, because the statutes
were less complex, and because statutory interpretation comprised a smaller part of the
federal court workload); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1983) (arguing that
early American judges, while paying lip service to the English tradition, would look at
legislative history whenever it was available).
69. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 764. Judge Mikva and Professor Lane note
that courts generally ignore the academic distinction between legislative intent and purpose, using them "unanalytically and interchangeably" when looking for meaning from
sources beyond the text of the statute. See id.; cf. HURST, supra note 62, at 32-33 (noting
that while the notion of "the intention of the legislature" is a legal fiction insofar as the
legislature does not have "one mind," its usefulness lies in the limit it places on those
rendering judgments).
70. See Breyer, supra note 68, at 848 (stating that using legislative history to determine
the meaning of unclear statutory language is logical because it helps the court understand
the goals of the statute and the context in which it was enacted). If the statute is unambiguous, courts generally apply the Plain Meaning Rule, which dictates that "[wihere the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not
arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citing Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421
(1899); cf Grad, supra note 60, at 257 (implying that examining legislative purpose should
not be confined to ambiguous provisions). Prof. Grad argues that the phenomenon of
"programmatic legislation" means that old rules of statutory construction are irrelevant,
and that courts should engage in "purpose interpretation" by which they should "give full
recognition to the statutory scheme" rather than apply restrictive rules. Id.
71. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05
(5th ed. 1992); Breyer, supra note 68, at 845 (noting that until the recent controversy over
using legislative history in statutory construction, courts thought it both natural and helpful
to refer to the legislative history).
72. See SINGER, supra note 71, § 48.01. Courts are not, however, required to find an
ambiguity before considering legislative history. See id.; see also Burlington Northern R.R.
Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (noting that judicial inquiry into
the meaning of a statute is complete once the court finds that the terms of the statute are
unambiguous "[ulnless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise" (citing Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955) (noting that ambiguity is not
always a prerequisite to using extrinsic aids); NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 515 n.6
(E.D. Va. 1958) (noting that while a court typically considers the legislative history to clarify a statutory ambiguity, ambiguity is not the sine qua non for such consideration), vacated, Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History
and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,
76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court lacks a unifying theory
of statutory interpretation, and noting that the Court either binds itself to statutory text, or
considers statutory purpose, legislative history, or a variety of other nontextual sources).
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interpreted.73 Although many jurists and scholars have criticized the interpretive value of legislative history in statutory construction,74 for the
purposes of this Comment, legislative history is a valuable and important
aid in statutory interpretation.75
C. Evidence of PresidentialIntent
Presidential intent, which may be implicit in legislation and legislative

history,76 is explicit in signing statements.77 Presidents generally issue
signing statements when they sign a bill into law, 78 and unlike veto
messages,79 these statements are discretionary; there is no constitutional
provision requiring a President to issue a statement when he signs a bill.
Signing statements serve four broad purposes.8 ° First, they explain what
the President believes will be the effect of the statute.8 1 Second, they

instruct officers of the executive branch how to interpret or administer
73. See SINGER, supra note 71, § 48.01.
74. See infra Part II.A (discussing recent criticism and defense of the use of legislative
history to interpret statutes).
75. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612 n.4 (1991) (noting that
the Court has traditionally utilized legislative history, and expecting that the practice will
continue); Breyer, supra note 68, at 871 (arguing that discontinuing the use of legislative
history would be unfair in part because legislators, attorneys, courts, and the public affected by legislation expect courts to use legislative history).
76. See infra Part II.
77. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, 1
PUB. PAPERS 561 (Mar. 30, 1994) (William Clinton) ("Consistent with the clear intent of
the Act, I will interpret the term 'full-time equivalent positions,' used in the legislation to
define annual employment ceilings, to mean 'full-time equivalent employment."'); Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1504, 1504 (Nov. 21, 1991)
(George Bush) (noting that "[i]t is extremely important that the statute be properly interpreted-by executive branch officials, by the courts, and by America's employers" and that
certain documents introduced by Senator Robert Dole will "be treated as authoritative
interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch"); Statement on Signing the
Sentencing Act of 1987, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1450 (Dec. 7, 1987) (Ronald Reagan) ("I understand section 2 of S. 1822 to mean that the Sentencing Reform Act applies to offenses
completed after it took effect. Offenses begun prior to, but not completed until on or after
November 1, 1987, will be subject to the Sentencing Reform Act.").
78. See Cross, supra note 9, at 209 (noting that a signing statement is usually a short
statement made when the bill is signed).
79. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The Constitution provides that if the President
does not approve of the bill presented to him, "he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on
their Journal." Id.
80. See Dellinger, PresidentialSigning Statements, supra note 10, at 333 & n.1 (outlining these purposes).
81. See id. at 333; see also infra Part I.D (describing and discussing the signing statements made by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton).
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the statute.8 2 Third, signing statements may state the President's belief
that there is a constitutional defect in the statute and that the President
will not enforce the unconstitutional provision.83 Fourth, and the topic of
82. See Dellinger, PresidentialSigning Statements, supra note 10, at 333; see also infra
Part I.D (describing and discussing the signing statements of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton).
83. See Dellinger, PresidentialSigning Statements, supra note 10, at 333. The corollary
of this use is to "creat[e] a record that can be used later to refute claims that the president
has approved of constitutionally dubious provisions in bills that the president has chosen to
sign because of his desire to see other provisions of the legislation become law." Nelson
Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 44. Courts and
commentators are split on whether the President has the constitutional authority to refuse
to enforce a law, or a portion thereof, he thinks is unconstitutional. For example, in
Freytag v. Commissioner, Justice Scalia stated in a concurring opinion that the President
may resist legislative encroachment upon his power by disregarding unconstitutional laws.
501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Furthermore, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel advised Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton that they may constitutionally refuse to enforce a "clearly unconstitutional law." See Dellinger, Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 10, at 336.
President Bush's Attorney General William Barr explained that a President may chose to
sign a law and refuse to enforce an unconstitutional provision rather than veto the entire
bill when a veto would be politically damaging. See William P. Barr, Attorney General's
Remarks, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
31, 39 (1993). An example of this situation is when Congress passes a large appropriations
bill and then adjourns, leaving the President in the position of choosing between shutting
down a part of the government, or signing the bill, noting his exception to the offending
provision. See id. Because of the provocative nature of this practice, Barr notes that the
position of the Office of Legal Counsel under the Bush administration was that signing
statements could be used in this way only "where the law encroached on executive authority." Id.; see also Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the
Honorable Abner J. Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REV. 313, 313 (1995) (arguing that "there are circumstances in which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that he
views as unconstitutional"); Kmiec, Balkanized Empires, supra note 65, at 81-82 ("Because
of the increasing impracticality of a veto, presidents have placed renewed emphasis upon
presidential signing statements to articulate their constitutional concerns.").
At the other end of the spectrum, in Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
court found "dubious" the President's claim that he could unilaterally declare that a statute
was unconstitutional and refuse to execute it. 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir. 1986). The court
distinguished this from the President's authority to veto, criticize, or refuse to defend in
court statutes about which he has constitutional qualms. See id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), as
well as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See id. at 889 n.11. Professor May argues that the intent of the framers supports the view that the President may not
refuse to enforce a law he thinks is unconstitutional. See Christopher N. May, Presidential
Defiance of "Unconstitutional"Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative,21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 865, 893-94 (1994). But see Dellinger, supra, at 336 & n.8 (arguing that the President's authority to refuse to enforce an unconstitutional law is consistent with the Framers
based upon a statement by Framer and later Supreme Court Justice James Wilson and
upon President Jefferson's pardon of all persons convicted under the Sedition Law because
he thought it unconstitutional). Professor May argues, however, that in the rare circumstance where the President is faced with executing a "patently invalid" law where refusing
to comply with the law is the only way to bring the law before the court, presidential
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this Comment, signing statements are used in an attempt to create legislative history in the expectation that courts will give the statement some
weight when construing the statute.84

These categories sometimes overlap. For example, in giving directions
to an executive agency, the President can instruct subordinates to resolve

statutory ambiguities in a way that he favors.85 Under the Chevron principle, this practice results in the President's interpretation receiving judicial deference. 6 As a relatively new phenomenon, interpretive
presidential signing statements present a new challenge to the courts.
D.

The Emergence of Interpretive PresidentialSigning Statements

The Reagan administration was the first to use signing statements "as a
tool for advancing a coherent legal strategy, 8 7 strengthening presidential
supervision over the executive branch.88 In drafting signing statements
for enrolled bills, the administration's self-proclaimed goal was to interpret vague language to be consistent with administration policy "so long
as it did not defy the legislative language or clear intent." 89
refusal to execute is justified. See May, supra, at 1101; see also Christine E. Burgess, Note,
When May a PresidentRefuse to Enforce the Law?, 72 TEx. L. REV. 631, 633 (1994) (arguing that the President can refuse to enforce a law he believes in good faith to be unconstitutional when he is protecting executive branch power, and when the Supreme Court has
previously held that the law, or a provision thereof, is unconstitutional).
84. See Dellinger, PresidentialSigning Statements, supra note 10, at 333. Signing statements are but one example of a nonlegislator's contribution to legislative history that
courts use. See generally Allison C. Giles, Comment, The Value of Nonlegislators'Contributions to Legislative History, 79 GEO. L.J. 359 (1990). The Supreme Court uses executive
branch views most often, the views of nonlegislators who were involved in drafting a statute second, and the views of nonlegislators who had no drafting role third. See id. at 36369. The executive branch views include presidential veto statements, signing statements,
messages to Congress which accompany executive legislative proposals, as well as statements by the federal agencies that will implement the legislation. See id. at 363-64.
85. See Lund, supra note 83, at 43-44.
86. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Chevron principle as
applied to executive interpretations).
87. Lund, supra note 83, at 43; see also Cross, supra note 9, at 209 (noting that President Reagan "transformed the customary 'photo session' of bill signing into a somewhat
more substantive episode" by his pervasive interpretation of new laws).
88. See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE
MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 52-53 (1992) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER].
Professor Kmiec served in the Office of Legal Counsel from 1985-89. See id. at 1. According to Professor Kmiec, vague language in many of the statutes delegating authority to
executive agencies created room for interpretation and discretion. See id. at 52. The Reagan administration decided that it would initiate a strategy that would ensure that the President, rather than "a less accountable and visible federal bureaucrat," exercise that
discretion. Id.
89. Id. Professor Kmiec seems quite serious about not promoting an interpretation
that undermines or distorts congressional intent. See id. at 57. He argues that in the case
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In 1986, then Attorney General Edwin Meese arranged with West Publishing Company to have signing statements published in the U.S. Code
Congressionaland Administrative News. 9° As a result, signing statements

became generally available for the first time. 91 In announcing the agreement, former Attorney General Meese noted that there is often confusion regarding what a law means because the President signs bills to
which he objects in part. 9 2 Former Attorney General Meese further commented that making the signing statement available to judges would "improve statutory interpretation. 93
1.

The Reagan Practice

From 1980 to 1988, President Reagan issued approximately 1046 signing statements accompanying the bills he signed into law.94 Some state-

ments were noncontroversial: in them the President described the bill, 95

of the signing statement for the 1986 Immigration Reform Act "the sheer length of the
statement suggested that too much was being read into, or out of, the statutory language."
Id.; see also Kmiec, Balkanized Empires, supra note 65, at 82 ("Any attempt by a President

to supply additional terms or adopt an interpretation that would do violence to the terms
provided by the Legislature would be unwarranted and antagonistic to legislative powers."). The partisan use of signing statements, however, is reflected in Professor Kmiec's
statement that aggressive use of signing statements was necessitated by the congressional
"practice of lumping together numerous unrelated provisions in omnibus bills," which
Kmiec regards as "congressional chicanery" because it "effectively denie[s] the President
his constitutionally provided veto authority." KMIEC, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER,
supra note 88, at 53. But see MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 739 (arguing that this
"chicanery" is the only way that Congress can do its work).
90. See Fred Strasser, Executive Intent, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 2.
91. Signing statements had also been available in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents since 1965, and annually in the Public Papers of the Presidents. Today,
signing statements are readily accessible on LEXIS and Westlaw.
92. See Strasser, supra note 90, at 2.
93. See id.
94. See 2 PUB. PAPERS C6-C7 (1988-89) (listing 32 bill signings); 1 PUB. PAPERS C6
(1988) (listing 13 bill signings); 2 PuB. PAPERS C10 (1987) (listing 28 bill signings); 1 PuB.
PAPERS C6 (1987) (listing 7 bill signings); 2 PUB. PAPERS C9-C1O (1986) (listing 55 bill
signings); 1 PUB. PAPERS C6 (1986) (listing 8 bill signings); 2 PUB. PAPERS 1555-63 (1985)
(listing 91 bills signed by the President); 1 PUB. PAPERS 881-83 (1985) (listing 15 bills approved by the President); 2 PUB. PAPERS 1947-60 (1984) (listing 218 bills approved by the
President); 1 PUB. PAPERS 977-82 (1984) (listing 66 bills approved by the President); 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1801-08 (1983) (listing 121 bills approved by the President); 1 PUB. PAPERS 1006-08
(1983) (listing 80 bills approved by the President); 2 PuB. PAPERS 1699-1708 (1982) (listing
156 bills approved by the President); 1 PUB. PAPERS 887-90 (1982) (listing 36 bills approved
by the President); PuB. PAPERS 1321-1328 (1981) (listing 120 bills approved by the
President).
95. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Temporary Emergency Wildfire Suppression
Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1151 (Sept. 9, 1988) (noting that the legislation would "facilitate assistance from Canada in fighting the current wildfires in the western United States"); Statement on Signing the Education of the Deaf Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1050 (Aug. 4, 1986)
(noting that the act "reestablishes Gallaudet College as Gallaudet University and autho-
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congratulated Congress on passing the bill,9 6 or criticized differences in
policy.97 In many statements, however, the President asserted that certain provisions violated the Constitution and interpreted them so as to be
constitutionally consistent by giving instructions to the affected agency.98
Specifically, President Reagan identified constitutional violations that encroached upon the President's power to recommend legislation, 9 the

rizes both the University and the National Technical Institution for the Deaf through fiscal
year 1991"); Statement on Signing the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 2
PUB. PAPERS 906, 906 (July 2, 1986) ("The act provides urgently needed funds for the
Community Credit Corporation, the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Courts, disaster
relief, and a number of other domestic programs... ").
96. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 969, 969 (July 19, 1988) (commending Congress for quickly
passing the legislation and for its fiscal restraint); Statement on Signing the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1441 (Oct. 21, 1986) (noting the President's "pleas[urel that the Congress, in passing reconciliation, has addressed many of the
concerns raised by the Administration"); Statement on Signing the Federal Employees
Benefits Improvement Act of 1986, 1 Pun. PAPERS 278 (Feb. 27, 1986) (congratulating
Congress for "enacting acceptable legislation

. . . so

quickly after my [prior] veto").

97. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 1
Pun. PAPERS 505, 506 (Apr. 22, 1988) (noting that "the bill's provision that would require
States to adhere to Federal standards when licensing wholesale drug distributors ... represents a substantial intrusion into traditional State responsibilities and prerogatives"); Statement on Signing the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1560
(Nov. 17, 1986) ("While I am strongly opposed to Federal regulation of private land use
planning, I am signing this bill because of the far-reaching support in both States for a
solution to the longstanding problems related to management of the Columbia River
Gorge."); Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1987, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1557, 1557 (Nov. 14, 1986) (noting the President's "disappoint[ment]
that the Congress saw the need to legislate the reorganization of the Special Operations
Forces").
98. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (discussing the specific constitutional violations President Reagan identified).
99. See, e.g., Statement on Signing Veterans Benefits Bill, 2 Pun. PAPERS 1558 (Nov.
18, 1988) (noting that a provision requiring that the Court of Veterans' Appeals budget be
included in the President's budget "'without review within the Executive branch' unconstitutionally interferes with the President's power to recommend to Congress "'such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient"'); Statement on Signing the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1988, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1469, 1469
(Nov. 7, 1988) (noting that the requirement in the Act that heads of departments and
agencies submit legislation to Congress will be implemented by the President consistent
with the power of the Recommendations Clause); Statement on Signing the Bill Authorizing Contracts for Federal Debt Collection, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1454 (Oct. 28, 1986) (noting that
the bill presented constitutional problems regarding the exercise of executive authority by
officers of the United States, and regarding the implementation of an affirmative action
program). The President directed the agencies involved in debt collection to implement
the statutory provisions so as to be consistent with the Constitution. See id.
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President's appointment power,'

the President's Take Care power, 10 1

the President's foreign affairs power,'0 2 the President's Commander-inChief power,10 3 and the President's power to receive ambassadors." ° In
100. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1988, 2 PUB.
1525 (Nov. 17, 1988) (interpreting a provision under which the Administrator of
General Services can assign to a State the authority of the United States under certain
conditions as "merely permitting the waiving of exclusive Federal jurisdiction in circumstances when it would be useful to permit State administration of State law"); Statement
on Signing the Bill Prohibiting the Licensing or Construction of Facilities on the Salmon
and Snake Rivers in Idaho, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1525 (Nov. 17, 1988) (stating that the provision
of the bill which requires the approval of a local governing body before the relevant federal agency can issue a license is unconstitutional because it violates the Appointments
Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution, and interpreting the provision
as an all out prohibition on the federal agency issuing a license); Statement on Signing the
Appalachia States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Consent Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 617, 618
(May 19, 1988) (noting that since the Act did not require that the Commission it established be appointed consistent with the Appointments Clause, the Commission would not
have the power to enforce Federal regulations).
101. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1344, 1345 (Oct. 18, 1988) (noting that some of the act's reporting "requirements would conflict with the constitutional protection afforded the integrity and confidentiality of the internal deliberations of the Executive branch and the President's authority as
head of the Executive branch to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed"' (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization
Act of 1987, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1524 (Dec. 15, 1987) (noting that in passing this legislation,
Congress has shown that it is "apparently convinced that it is empowered to divest the
President of his fundamental constitutional authority to enforce our nation's laws"); Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, 2 PUB. PAPERS 818-19
(July 11, 1987) (interpreting a spending provision consistent with the President's Take Care
power).
102. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1249, 1250 (Sept. 29, 1988) (noting that a provision in the act prohibiting the use of funds to assist the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance does not apply insofar
as it conflicts with the President's foreign affairs powers); Statement on Signing the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1541, 1542 (Dec.
22, 1987) (noting that the provision of the Act which forbids closing consulates interferes
with the President's foreign affairs power); Statement on Signing the RMS Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1411, 1412 (Oct. 21, 1986) (noting that if certain
provisions were interpreted literally, they would conflict with the President's power to conduct foreign relations).
103. See Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, Fiscal
Year 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1230 (Sept. 27, 1988) (noting that the provision of the act requiring the Secretary of Defense to "inform specified congressional committees of the plans
and scope for any proposed military exercise involving United States personnel 30 days
prior to its occurring, if amounts expended ... are anticipated to exceed $100,000" would
be interpreted consistent with the President's authority "to protect the national security");
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1557, 1558 (Nov. 14, 1986) (noting that a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to make available certain information to the Congress conflicts with the President's
control over sensitive national security information).
104. See Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1988, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1419 (Dec. 2, 1987) (noting that the section of the bill purporting to "require
PAPERS
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some statements, the President himself severed provisions from laws that
he said were unconstitutional. 1 5 In other statements, the President interaspreted certain provisions. 10 6 In at least one statement, the President
10 7

serted that his signing statement constituted legislative history.
2. The Bush Practice

The Bush administration continued the Reagan practice of using signing statements to strengthen presidential control.' As former Attorney
the Attorney General to report to the Congress internal disagreements between executive
officials about the admission of foreign officials to the United States" is unconstitutional
because it violates the President's "constitutional authority to 'receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers"' and instructing the Attorney General to not comply with that
section).
105. See, e.g., Statement on Signing a Bill Providing for the Leasing of Property to the
District of Columbia Chapter of the American National Red Cross, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1485
(Nov. 8, 1988) (noting that a provision which requires the "General Services Administration to obtain the approval of the Public Works and Transportation Committee of the
House of Representatives in exercising the authority granted" in the Act is unconstitutional, and directing the General Services Administration to not exercise the discretionary
authority the Act purports to give it); Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1284, 1284 (Oct. 5,
1988) (noting that a provision which requires cabinet secretaries to "reduce funding to
Indian tribes if so directed by a statement from a Member of Congress" is unconstitutional,
and severing that provision from the Act). President Reagan in effect severed a portion of
the Bankruptcy Code bill of 1987 when he directed the Attorney General to not defend a
section of the bill which the President asserted was an unconstitutional private bankruptcy
law. Statement on Signing a Bill Amending the Bankruptcy Code, 1 PUB. PAPERS 518, 519
(May 15, 1987).
106. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1988, 2 PuB.
PAPERS 1244 (Sept. 28, 1988) ("1 have approved H.R. 2342 with the understanding, which
is clearly supported by the Joint Statement of Managers to accompany the Conference
Report on H.R. 2342, that this section is not intended to affect the Coast Guard's recently
announced policy regarding nonemergency assistance."); Statement on Signing the Sentencing Act of 1987, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1450 (Dec. 7, 1987) ("I understand section 2 of S.1822
to mean that the Sentencing Reform Act applies to offenses completed after it took effect."); Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1522, 1522-24 (Nov. 6, 1986) (interpreting in minute detail numerous provisions of
the Act); Statement on Signing the Bill Extending the Equal Access to Justice Act, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 977 (Aug. 5, 1985) (stating that the bill's substantial justification standard was an
easier standard to meet than either the arbitrary or capricious standard or the substantial
evidence standard).
107. See Statement on Signing the Bill to Increase the Federal Debt Ceiling, 2 PUB.
1096, 1096-97 (Sept. 29, 1987). The statement asserted that "certain provisions of
th[e] joint resolution require technical comment as a matter of legislative history." Id. at
1096. The President then construed a certain provision of the Act "which contains parenthetical language that could be viewed as attempting to incorporate committee reports by
reference into legislation-consistently with my understanding that material intended to
have the force of law must itself be presented to the President." Id. at 1097.
108. See Lund, supra note 83, at 38-39. Former Attorney General Barr served as President Bush's Attorney General from 1991-93. See Barr, supra note 83, at 31. Former AtPAPERS
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General William Barr stated, President Bush's signing statements "set
forth the President's understanding of how a particular provision in the

bill [was] to be interpreted [by the agency], his understanding of what it
mean[t], or his directive as to how the executive branch [was] going to
interpret it."' 9 Nevertheless, a critic from within the Bush administration argued that in practice, President Bush's use of signing statements
was more of a resistance to what he regarded as congressional encroachments on executive power than it was an assertion of presidential control
over the executive branch."' Furthermore, it has been suggested that
President Bush's signing statements, in contrast to President Reagan's,
provisions ... inconsistent[ly] with the
often "interpreted objectionable
11
statutory language. "'

torney General Barr noted, "Signing statements provide the needed direction to guide
subordinate executive officers on how to execute the law faithfully." Id. at 40. In passing,
Attorney General Barr also noted, "It is unclear what weight, if any, the courts will give to
To the extent that legislative history is given effect, it may be that
such statements ....
presidential signing statements should be viewed as part of legislative history." Id.; see also
Lund, supra note 83, at 38-39. Nelson Lund, who served President Bush in the White
House Counsel's office and in the Office of Legal Counsel, notes that "Reagan's constitutional lawyers ... had worked out a detailed jurisprudence that was scarcely revised or
supplemented during the Bush years. Bush's new initiative [i.e., his use of signing statements] may be viewed merely as an elevation of the Reagan administration's jurisprudence
to the status of administration policy." Id. (footnotes omitted).
109. Barr, supra note 83, at 40; see also infra notes 112-126 and accompanying text
(setting forth examples of President Bush's signing statements giving instructions to executive agencies).
110. See Lund, supra note 83, at 46. Professor Lund explains that President Bush's
signing statements focused on issues regarding presidential authority. See id. "It should
come as no surprise that President Bush was most aggressive in his defense of the authority
of his office in the field of foreign relations, where his expertise and interest were greatest."
Id. at 51; see also Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 239, 240-41 (Feb. 16, 1990) (detailing objections to at
least ten provisions in one bill on foreign affairs power grounds). Professor Lund notes
that:
[President] Bush's signing statements are pervaded by an amazing scrupulosity
about the separation of powers that becomes at times almost comical. Even a
cursory review of the record suggests that the administration tried to identify and
deal with every issue, no matter how small, in every bill that was presented to the
President.
Lund, supra note 83, at 44. Professor Lund concludes that Bush's defensive strategy was
somewhat insignificant because it amounted to no more than "a kind of gesturing" in
which he signalled to Congress that he would defend the presidency against what in his
estimation were encroachments on his power. Id. at 46. But see KMIEC, AITrORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, supra note 88, at 52 (arguing that President Reagan's use of signing statements emphasized strengthening presidential control over the agencies).
111. Lund, supra note 83, at 44.
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From 1988 to 1992, President Bush issued approximately 239 signing
statements accompanying the bills he signed into law. 112 Some statements were noncontroversial: in them the President merely described the
various provisions of the bill,1 13 took credit for the policy being en-

acted,114 or criticized a certain aspect of the bill.

5

In many of the state-

ments, however, President Bush noted that because certain provisions
attempted to encroach upon executive power, he would interpret them so

as to be consistent with the Constitution."16 Specifically, he identified
encroachment upon the appointments power, 117 the foreign relations

112. See 2 PUB. PAPERS C4-C5 (1992-93) (listing 75 bill signing statements); 1 PUB.
C6-C7 (1992-93) (listing 15 bill signing statements); 2 PUB. PAPERS C4-C5 (1991)
(listing 28 bill signing statements); 1 PUB. PAPERS C5 (1991) (listing nine bill signing statements); 2 PUB. PAPERS C4-C5 (1990) (listing 55 bill signing statements); 1 PUB. PAPERS C6
(1990) (listing nine bill signing statements); 2 PUB. PAPERS C7-C8 (1989) (listing 41 bill
signing statements); 1 PUB. PAPERS C7 (1989) (listing seven bill signing statements).
113. See Statement on Signing the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS
2156 (Nov. 4, 1992) ("H.R. 5193 implements the Administration's proposal to establish the
Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Registry.... [It] also authorizes VA to provide counseling services to women who suffer the trauma of being sexually assaulted or harassed during
their military service."); Statement on Signing the Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity,
Noise Improvement, and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2122,
2122 (Oct. 31, 1992) ("This bill will authorize substantial funding for the next 3 years to
modernize the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control system.").
114. See Statement on Signing the Arkansas-Idaho Land Exchange Act of 1992, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 2152 (Nov. 2,1992) (claiming that the protection of wetlands is a Bush Administration priority); Statement on Signing the Hawaii Tropical Forest Recovery Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2074, 2074 (Oct. 29, 1992) (claiming that the President's "Forests for the Future"
initiative was responsible for the legislation).
115. See Statement on Signing the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1552, 1553 (Nov. 5, 1990) (noting disappointment with Congress for not providing the appropriations requested to develop the technology to make possible manned Moon and
Mars missions).
116. See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying text (describing President Bush's specific constitutional objections).
117. The majority of these concerns involved what President Bush saw as conflicts with
his authority under the Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Statement
on Signing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2156, 2157 (Nov. 4, 1992) (noting that he signed the bill with the
understanding that panel members who are not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause perform only advisory functions); Statement on Signing the Reclamation
Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2101, 2102 (Oct. 30,
1992) (interpreting a provision that required the President to appoint members of a Commission from certain recommendations, as a suggestion that the President make the appointments based on the recommendations).
PAPERS
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power, 118 the Commander-in-Chief power, 119 the President's authority
over executive agencies, 12 0 and the President's power to recommend legislation. 2 ' Sometimes these "constitutional defects" led President Bush
to refuse to give legal force to a provision he thought violated the Constitution,1 22 or to refuse to expend any appropriated funds until Congress
enacted legislation to cure the constitutional defects. 2 3 Some signing

118. See Statement on Signing the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 2
2150, 2151 (Nov. 2, 1992) (noting that since some provisions could encroach
upon the President's foreign relations power, the President would construe those provisions to be advisory rather than mandatory); Statement on Signing the Indian Health
Amendments of 1992,2 PuB. PAPERS 2074 (Oct. 29, 1992) (refusing to apply a "Buy American" provision to the extent that the President "determine[s] it would violate the Nation's
international obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or any other
international agreement to which this country is a party").
119. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1556, 1557 (Nov. 5, 1990) (construing provisions which purport to set
limits on the number of military personnel stationed in certain foreign countries as consistent with the President's constitutional authority).
120. See Statement on Signing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Authorization Act of 1992, 2 PuB. PAPERS 2072, 2073 (Oct. 29, 1992) (noting that the President signed the bill with the understanding that "[p]rovisions requiring an executive agency
to consult with another executive agency or private group concerning executive policy do
not dictate the decisionmaking structure or chain of command of the executive branch
deliberative process"); Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1555, 1556 (Nov. 5, 1990) (noting
that provisions which prohibit expenditure of funds for reviewing agency orders and regulations impair the President's ability "to supervise the executive branch").
121. See Statement on Signing the Veterans Home Loan Program Amendments of
1992, 2 PUn. PAPERS 2056, 2057 (Oct. 28, 1992) (interpreting as advisory rather than
PUB. PAPERS

mandatory a provision of the bill that "purports to require the Secretary of Veterans Af-

fairs to recommend future legislation regarding a pilot program for housing loans to Native
American Veterans"); Statement on Signing the Intermodal Safe Container Transportation
Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2057 (Oct. 28, 1992) (interpreting as advisory rather than
mandatory a provision of the bill that "purports to require the Secretary of Transportation
to submit.., legislative and other recommendations for improving the collection of certain
transportation data").
122. See Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 2 PuB.
PAPERS 1553, 1555 (Nov. 5, 1990) (instructing the Secretary of Health and Human Services
that a provision in the bill which requires the Secretary to base a substantive decision upon
the statements of persons not appointed by the President "is without legal force"); Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1991, 2 Pun. PAPERS 1558, 1559 (Nov. 5, 1990) (treating provisions which purport to
condition the use of funds by the President and executive branch officials upon congressional approval as without legal force).
123. See Statement on Signing the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment
Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2101, 2103 (Oct. 30, 1992) ("I direct the Secretary of the
Interior, in consultation with the Attorney General, to propose legislation to remedy [certain] constitutional defects. Such legislation must be effective prior to the expenditure of
any appropriated funds.").
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statements provided instructions to executive agencies, 114 while others interpreted specific provisions of a bill by defining specific terms therein,125
126
or asserted that a bill did not authorize a private right of action.
3. The Clinton Practice
The aggressive use of signing statements appears to be continuing during the Clinton Administration. 127 Since taking office in January 1993,
President Clinton has issued approximately 162 signing statements accompanying the bills he has signed into law. 128 Consistent with the traditional practice, some of the statements are non-interpretive and fulfill the
ceremonial function of describing the new law 129 or congratulating mem124. See id. at 2102 (noting that since some provisions might violate State primacy in
Federal Western water policy, "I am directing the Secretary of the Interior, in implementing this legislation, to ensure that its provisions are conducted with due deference to State
primacy.").
125. See Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 2 PuB.
PAPERS 1553, 1554-55 (Nov. 5, 1990) (signing the bill with the understanding that a "'sectarian organization"' includes religious organizations in general, and that "'organization'
means not only the particular provider but also a broader association with which that provider may be identified"); Statement on Signing the San Carlos Mineral Strip Act of 1990,
2 PuB. PAPERS 1439 (Oct. 22, 1990) (adopting the Congressional Committee Report's description of the specific parcel of land affected by the bill).
126. See Statement on Signing the Bill Reauthorizing Native American Higher Education Assistance, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1497 (Oct. 30, 1990) (construing a provision prohibiting any
restriction on the right of Native Americans to express themselves in their native language
during public proceedings as not conferring a private right of action).
127. See infra notes 129-40 (describing President Clinton's signing statements). At this
time there is not an official Clinton Administration opinion of the interpretive status of
signing statements. One of the sources for this Comment is a memo from the Office of
Legal Counsel to the White House Counsel, at that time Bernard Nussbaum, outlining the
arguments for and against court use of signing statements without deciding whether such
use was legitimate. See Dellinger, PresidentialSigning Statements, supra note 10, at 339.
Judge Mikva, who also served as White House counsel, is opposed to the use of signing
statements in statutory construction. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 784-85 (noting
that a signing statement "is not a part of the enactment process ... [because] [w]hile the
President has the power to veto a bill and the legislature has the power to override the
veto, the legislature has no power to veto or override" the signing statement); see also infra
note 255.
128. Since June 30, 1995, President Clinton has issued 63 signing statements. See
Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, PRESDC File (Nov. 24, 1996) (searching with terms
"'William Clinton' or 'William J. Clinton' and sign or signing or remark! and date (aft 06/
30/95)"); see also 1 PUB. PAPERS C3 (1995) (listing six bill signing statements); 2 PuB.
PAPERS C3-C4 (1994) (listing 36 bill signing statements); 1 Pua. PAPERS C5 (1994) (listing
13 bill signing statements); 2 PUB. PAPERS C4-C5 (1993) (listing 33 bill signing statements);
1 PUB. PAPERS C7 (1993) (listing 11 bill signing statements).
129. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Health Centers Consolidation Act of 1996, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2041 (Oct. 11, 1996) (describing the Act in general and highlighting some of its features); Statement on Signing the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2042 (Oct. 11, 1996) (describing the
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bers of Congress for passing the bill.13° Some signing statements list provisions the President opposes but do not go as far as to state that the
President will refuse to enforce the law. 131 However, in at least two state-

ments, President Clinton determined that a provision was unconstitutional and stated that the Attorney General would not defend or enforce
it. 1 32

Some statements note potential constitutional problems without of-

fering an alternative interpretation, 3 3 while others adopt an interpretation that the President asserts is consistent with the Constitution. 3 4
broad purposes of the Act and thanking those involved for their work in reaching an agreement); Statement on Signing the District of Columbia Emergency Highway Relief Act, 31
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1378, 1378 (Aug. 4, 1995) ("Today I am pleased to sign into
law H.R. 2017, the District of Columbia Emergency Highway Relief Act, a law to enable
our Nation's capital city to advance critically needed highway construction projects.").
130. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1996, 1996-97 (Oct. 11, 1996) (thanking the participants for their work in getting the bill passed and enacted); Statement on Signing the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1962, 1962 (Nov. 2,
1994) ("I want to commend the bill's sponsors, particularly Chairman Metzenbaum and
Senator Thurmond in the Senate, and Chairman Brooks and Representative Fish in the
House.").
131. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1487, 1488-89) (Aug. 22, 1996)
(listing the provisions of the Welfare Reform legislation which the President opposed);
Statement on Signing the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 593, 593-94 (Mar. 29, 1996) (stating the President's opposition to certain
parts of the congressional review provisions); Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Legislation, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1377,
1377 (Aug. 4, 1995) ("I do not support every provision of this bill."). In this context, President Clinton has lobbied for the line-item veto. See Statement on Signing the Military
Construction Appropriations Act, 1996, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1761, 1761 (Oct. 3,
1995) (stating that the President needs line-item veto authority).
132. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Reauthorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 260, 261 (Feb. 10, 1996) (determining unconstitutional the provision requiring discharge of military personnel infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)); Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 218, 219 (Feb. 8, 1996) (declining to enforce the Act's
prohibition on the transmittal of abortion-related speech because the Department of Justice had determined that the provision was unconstitutional). In the 1997 Act, this provision was omitted. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Reauthorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1841, 1842 (Sept. 23, 1996).
133. See Statement on Signing the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1471, 1472 (Aug. 15, 1994) (noting that the Department
of Justice had advised the President that the removal provision for the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration raised a significant constitutional question); Statement
on Signing the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1995, 1 Pun. PAPERS 301, 301 (July
22, 1994) (noting that a law requiring executive branch agencies to receive approval "from
the Public Printer before procuring the production of certain Government documents
outside of the Government Printing Office" raises serious constitutional questions).
134. See Statement on Signing Transportation Legislation, 1 Pun. PAPERS 1198, 1199
(July 5, 1994) (interpreting certain provisions of a law as not binding and directing the
Secretary of Transportation to consider any appointment lists submitted by Congress as
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Similarly, President Clinton has used signing statements to instruct agencies to avoid constitutional problems,135 and to interpret statutory terms
in a manner that reflects the Administration's policy preferences. 136 Consistent with Presidents Reagan and Bush, President Clinton asserts that
he will interpret provisions that present potential or actual conflicts with
express executive powers, such as the appointments power 1 37 and the
Commander-in-Chief and foreign affairs powers, 138 consistent with the
advisory in order to avoid constitutional problems); see also the following statements all of
which interpret a purported legislative veto provision inconsistent with the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto as interpreted in INS v. Chadha, and therefore declaring that
the provision will be ignored. Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1672, 1672 (Sept. 30, 1994);
Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1674, 1674 (Sept. 30, 1994); Statement on Signing the 'Teasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1855, 1855-56 (Oct. 28, 1993).
135. See Statement on Signing Legislation To Reauthorize the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Office of Special Counsel, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1906, 1906 (Oct. 29, 1994)
(directing "agencies to follow appropriate procedures to protect the constitutional rights of
...Federal employees" affected by the legislation).
136. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1994 and 1995, 1 PUB. PAPERS 807, 809 (Apr. 30, 1994) (interpreting a provision as consistent with his Administration's views until it is "corrected in a manner acceptable to my
Administration").
137. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES.

Doc. 2112, 2113 (Oct. 19, 1996) (directing the Secretary of Trans-

portation to treat appointments recommendations from certain state officials as advisory
rather than mandatory); Statement on Signing the Sustainable Fisheries Act, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2040, 2041 (Oct. 11, 1996) (directing the Secretary of Commerce to
treat a provision raising Appointments Clause issues as advisory rather than mandatory);
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1841, 1843 (Sept. 23, 1996) (urging Congress to amend the
provision of the bill which violates the Appointments Clause, and directing the National
Ocean Leadership Council to not exercise significant government authority).
138. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1869, 1869-70 (Oct. 25, 1994) (instructing the Secretary of
State to "construe" the statute so as to avoid impermissible impingement on the president's "constitutional authorities concerning receipt of Ambassadors, recognition of governments, and the conduct of foreign policy"); Statement on Signing Legislation Regarding
United States Policy Toward Haiti, 2 PUB. PAPERS, 1897, 1897 (Oct. 25, 1994) (interpreting
a certain provision as requiring the President to give to the Senate "only information about
the rules of engagement that I may supply consistent with my constitutional responsibilities, and not information of a sensitive operational nature"); Statement on Signing the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1704, 1705 (Oct.
5, 1994) (interpreting provisions regarding national security and defense policies consistent
with the President's Commander-in-Chief authority and constitutional authority for the
conduct of foreign affairs); Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 1 PUB. PAPERS 807, 808 (Apr. 30, 1994) (construing provisions
so that they do not infringe on the President's discretion over foreign affairs or his Commander-in-Chief powers); Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1958, 1958 (Nov. 11, 1993) (construing a certain section as
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Constitution. Two statements appear to present interpretations aimed at
the courts. In one statement, President Clinton advised the courts as to

what their interpretation of certain provisions should be;' 39 in the other,
the President made a highly technical interpretation.14 °
E. Response to Interpretive Signing Statements by Commentators
and Courts
1.

The CriticalResponse

Formalist critics argue that signing statements have little or no interpretive value under the Constitution. The thrust of these arguments is that
court use of signing statements violates the principle of separation of
powers because the President is not a legislator.' 4 ' On this view, the
President's role in legislating is strictly limited to the qualified veto,'4 2 the
ten day time period in which the President can sign or veto a bill,' 4 3 and

the President's power to recommend legislation."' Judicial use of a signing statement, therefore, aggrandizes the Presidential role by giving him
the power of an absolute or line-item veto, 4 5 because once the President
not restricting the President's "constitutional responsibility and authority as CommanderIn-Chief, including my ability to place U.S. combat forces under the temporary tactical
control of a foreign commander where to do otherwise would jeopardize the safety of U.S.
combat forces in support of UNOSOM II").
139. See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 719, 720 (Apr. 24, 1996).
140. See Statement on Signing the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 561, 561 (Mar. 30, 1994) (stating that "[clonsistent with the clear intent of the Act,
I will interpret the term 'full-time equivalent positions,' used in the legislation to define
annual employment ceilings, to mean 'full-time equivalent employment"').
141. See Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, PresidentialSigning Statements as Interpretationsof Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 363, 370 (1987). One commentator even suggests that signing statements should be
censored. See Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REv. 755, 787 (1987) (suggesting legislation be enacted prohibiting the publication of signing statements).
142. The Constitution gives the President the power to veto any legislation. See U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. However, the President's veto is subject to an override by a twothirds majority of both houses. See id.
143. The Constitution gives the President ten days in which to veto legislation. See id.
If the President does not sign the bill within ten days, the bill automatically becomes law
unless the President is prevented from returning it to Congress because they have adjourned. See id. This latter event is known as the pocket veto, and the only type of adjournment which can cause a pocket veto is an intersession adjournment. See Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
144. The Constitution requires that the President recommend legislation to Congress.
See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3; Garber & Wimmer, supra note 141, at 374.
145. See Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act Amendments of 1988, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1284, 1284 (Oct. 5, 1988). In his signing statement, President Reagan severed from the bill a provision requiring cabinet secretaries to
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has signed the bill, Congress will not debate and vote on the Presidential
interpretation unless it enacts new legislation. 146 Similarly, court use of a
signing statement would violate the ten-day limit because courts would be

14 7
Fiusing the signing statement after that ten-day period had elapsed.
nally, because a signing statement is not a recommendation, it is not a
1 48
source of presidential interpretive power.

Critics who advance the theory of the unitary executive 149 argue that
150
court use of signing statements is appropriate in some circumstances.
Thus, Professor Cross distinguishes between signing statements as a species of legislative history and signing statements that provide interpretive
directions to the implementing administrative agency.15 1 Professor Cross
posits that signing statements as a species of legislative history have little
interpretive value, while signing statements which give intructions to the
implementing administrative agency should be given some interpretive
weight.' 5 2 Under his argument, signing statements as legislative history
have little interpretive value because they do not fit within the framework
according legislative history interpretive value. 1 53 The interpretive value
of a piece of legislative history, therefore, depends upon the legislator's
involvement in preparing and promoting the legislation, and upon

whether the legislator's views were presented to other legislators prior to
enactment. 54 Under this regime, signing statements are classified as a
type of post-enactment history having little interpretive value.
reduce funding to Indian tribes upon the direction of designated members of Congress.
See id. In this action, President Reagan arguably vetoed that "line" from the bill. The
effect of the recently enacted Line Item Veto Act on this argument is limited. That Act
empowers the President to cancel parts of appropriations bills which relate to discretionary
spending, new direct spending, or that are tax benefits which affect a limited number of
people. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 140-130, § 1021(a), 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 681).
146. See Garber & Wimmer, supra note 141, at 375-76.
147. See id. at 377.
148. See id. at 379-80.
149. See supra note 51 (defining and discussing the unitary theory of the executive).
150. Underlying the interpretive value of presidential signing statements is the theory
that the President has a constitutionally-permissible active role in legislating. See Mark R.
Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the Presidentin the Creation of Legis-

lative History, 48 ARK. L. REv. 239, 240-42 (1994) (arguing that since the President has a
constitutional role in the conception and interpretation of the laws, executive statements
regarding the meaning of a law have interpretive value).
151. Cross, supra note 9, at 222-30.
152. Id. at 225.
153. See id. at 222.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 222-23; see also SINGER, supra note 71, §§ 49.01-.03. The interpretive

value of post-enactment history varies depending upon what the history is. For example,
"[l1ong continued contemporaneous and practical interpretation of a statute by the execu-
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Distinct from the signing statement as a species of legislative history is
156
the statement that gives instructions to the implementing agency.
These signing statements are due judicial deference for the same reasons

that agency interpretations are given deference: expertise, 157 consistency, 58 contemporaneity, 5 9 and executive authority. 60 Thus, the
weight given a signing statement will depend upon whether its interpreta-

tion as communicated to the agency persists over time, whether the President was in favor of the legislation, and the breadth of the grant of power
6
to the agency.1 '
Professor Popkin has argued that courts should defer to signing statements inonly two situations: when the President has threatened to veto

legislation and, as a result, he and the Congress arrive at a compromise; 162 and when the legislation affects the President's specifically
granted constitutional powers, such as the appointments and foreign relations power. 1 63 Professor Popkin specifically attacked some of President
Reagan's signing statements as being politically manipulative and therefore, not warranting judicial deference. 6
2. Judicial Use of Signing Statements
Prior to 1986, only six reported cases available on electronic databases

cited signing statements.

65

Since then, at least forty-two cases have cited

tive officers charged with its administration and enforcement ... constitutes an invaluable
aid in determining the meaning of a doubtful statute." Id. § 49.03.
156. See supra Part I.D (for examples of signing statements in which Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton gave instructions to the agency regarding the implementation of the
statute).
157. See Cross, supra note 9, at 229-31 (noting that courts do not assess an agency's
expertise).
158. See id. at 231-32 (indicating that the Supreme Court defers to the executive interpretation of statutes because the agencies rely upon the executive interpretation).
159. See id. at 232-33 (noting that signing statements are as contemporaneous as is
physically possible).
160. See id. at 233-34 (noting that courts defer to the agency interpretion because the
agency is responsible for implementing the law).
161. See id. at 229-34. As to the last consideration, the author elaborates that the
greater deference the agency has, the greater the weight the signing statement is given. See
id. at 233.
162. See Popkin, supra note 15, at 715 (noting that when a legislative compromise is
recorded in a signing statement, it should be given weight).
163. See id. at 716 (arguing that when legislation infringes on an enumerated presidential power, signing statements could be given interpretive weight).
164. See id. at 709. Professor Popkin argues that President Reagan's interpretations
either chose a side on an issue that was unresolved at the congressional level, or "attempted to undermine the statutory structure." Id. at 705.
165. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 678 n.16 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (using President Johnson's signing statement regarding amendments to the Free-
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signing statements. 166 Nearly half of the cases use just three signing statedom of Information Act in dicta to narrow the focus of the court's holding); Clifton D.
Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1969) (using President Truman's signing
statement regarding the Portal-to-Portal Act in support of the proposition that the Act's
good faith exception was to be measured by an objective standard); Creek Nation v.
United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 483, 493 (1964) (using President Roosevelt's signing statement
regarding the Indian Claim's Commission Act to conclude that the fundamental purpose of
the Act was to provide a special venue for Indian claims and to give Indians a "fair deal");
Grumbine v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1144,1146 n.4 (D.D.C. Cir. 1984) (using President
Kennedy's signing statement regarding the Equal Pay Act to assert that the purpose of the
Act was to eliminate wage discrimination based on sex); Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 410 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (quoting President
Johnson's signing statement regarding the Freedom of Information Act to describe the
basic philosophy of the Act); DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (using
President Nixon's signing statement regarding the Military Procurement Authorization Act
of 1971 in which the President stated that the Mansfield Amendment, which referred to the
manner in which American involvement in Vietnam should be ended, did not affect the
Administration's policy regarding ending American involvement in the war).
166. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 n.3 (1995) (mentioning that President Bush in his signing statement criticized the law as inappropriately overriding state
firearm laws); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 & n.1 (1986) (noting in a footnote that
President Reagan asserted in his signing statement that the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act was constitutionally defective); United States v. Lewis, 90 F.3d
302, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the defendant's argument that President Clinton's
signing statement, which rejected the Federal Sentencing Guidelines proposal to equalize
the penalties for crack and powder cocaine, supported the defendant's position that the
disparity violated the equal protection clause because President Clinton in the statement
recognized the disparity); United States v. Stokes, 66 F.3d 569, 584 n.24 (3d Cir. 1995)
(noting "in passing" that President Bush in his signing statement praised the Anti Car
Theft Act of 1992 for making carjacking a federal offense); United States v. Yacoubian, 24
F.3d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1994) (using President Bush's signing statement as support for Congress's rational basis for enacting retroactive legislation); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d
262, 268 (11th Cir. 1994) (using President Bush's signing statement regarding the Florida
Keys Act to determine congressional intent); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1360 (5th
Cir. 1993) (using President Bush's signing statement, as the final portion of the legislative
history of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, in support of the argument that the Act was an
unconstitutional use of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); Saleh v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 238 n.7 (2d Cir. 1991) (using President Bush's signing
statement to verify the date upon which the bill was signed); United States v. Palta, 880
F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1989) (using President Reagan's signing statement regarding technical corrections to the Sentencing Guidelines to define the provision for departing from the
guidelines for an aggravating or mitigating circumstance); In re Unimet Corp., 842 F.2d
879, 885 n.6 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the district court decision below was in error to the
extent that it relied upon President Reagan's signing statement regarding amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code); Capital Cities Media v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.18 (3d Cir.
1986) (using President Johnson's signing statement regarding the Freedom of Information
Act to note that the Act did not impair the President's ability to protect the national interest by ensuring confidentiality); Berry v. Department of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1349-50
(9th Cir. 1984) (using President Johnson's signing statement regarding the Freedom of Information Act to interpret one of the goals of the Act); Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing President
Ford's statement on signing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, wherein he stated that he had constitutional reservations about the provi-
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ments.' 67 Analysis of court use of signing statements reveals that while
sion of the Act which would allow Congress to veto proposed arms sales, to support the
proposition that the Executive has not accepted the constitutionality of congressional
schemes to disapprove Executive action by concurrent resolution); Crowley Marine Servs.
v. FEDNAV Ltd., 915 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (using President Bush's signing
statement as support for what the Congress intended to accomplish with the 1982 amendments to the CERCLA); Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 845 F. Supp.
902, 905-06 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that President Bush had expressed concern about the
constitutionality of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act Amendments in his signing
statement); United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 n.10 (D. Kan. 1994) (noting in
a footnote describing portions of the legislative history of the bill that President Bush in his
signing statement was concerned that portions of the federal Crime Control Act of 1990
encroached on traditional state authority); United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 451 (D.
Kan. 1994) (noting that another court which considered the constitutionality of a portion of
the Crime Control Act of 1990 had noted that President Bush in his signing statement was
concerned that portions of the federal Crime Control Act of 1990 encroached on traditional state authority); Comes Flying v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 529, 531 n.2 (D.S.D.
1993) (noting that the only piece of legislative history regarding the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act was President Bush's signing statement wherein he
noted his "distaste" for a certain provision); Cowsen-el v. United States Dep't of Justice,
826 F. Supp. 532, 536 (D.D.C. 1992) (using President Ford's signing statement regarding
the Privacy Act to determine the day upon which the Act was signed into law); Hadden v.
Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 679, 684 & n.2 (D. Utah 1986) (noting that President Reagan's signing
statement regarding the Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act could not change the
clear intent of Congress in passing the law); Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1394
n.22 (D.D.C. 1986) (citing in a footnote President Reagan's signing statement as support
for the proposition that the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
was unconstitutional); NRG Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 659, 669 (1994) (using President Reagan's signing statement regarding the Takings Act to support the congressional
intent); Monteverdi v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 19 Cl. Ct. 409,
429 n.93 (1990) (using President Reagan's signing statement regarding the Equal Access to
Justice Act).
167. Eleven of the cases use President Bush's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights
Amendments of 1991. See Butts v. New York Dep't of Housing Preservation & Dev., 990
F.2d 1397, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993) (using President Bush's signing statement to conclude that
there was no congressional intent as to whether the Amendments should be applied retroactively or prospectively); In re Estate of Reynolds, 985 F.2d 470, 477 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to give weight to President Bush's signing statement regarding the retroactivity of
the amendments); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir. 1992)
(using President Bush's signing statement to note the day on which the Amendments were
signed); Cohen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 819 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.H. 1993) (using President Bush's signing statement to conclude that there was no congressional intent as to
whether the Amendments should be applied retroactively or prospectively); Beardsley v.
Isom, 828 F. Supp. 397, 399 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same), affd sub. nom 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir.
1994); Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 393, 397 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (using President
Bush's signing statement as support that Congress did not agree on the applicability of the
amendments); James v. American Int'l Recovery, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1156, 1170 (N.D. Ga.
1992) (using President Bush's signing statement to note the day on which the Amendments
were signed); Crumley v. Delaware State College, 797 F. Supp. 341, 348 n.8 (D. Del. 1992)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that President Bush's signing statement be given significant weight); Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(using President Bush's signing statement as support that Congress intended prospective
enforcement of the Amendments); McCullough v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 785 F. Supp.
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signing statements are subject to similar abuses as legislative history, they
can also provide the same assistance. 68 Certainly, a noncontroversial use
of signing statements is to confirm the date upon which a bill was enacted
by the President's signature. 6 9
a. When the Court Tips Its Hat to the President
The least controversial use of signing statements is when courts support

their conclusion with a "tip of the hat" to the President's opinion regarding the constitutionality of the statute or certain of its provisions as expressed in the signing statement. 7 ° In Bowsher v. Synar,'7 1 the Supreme
Court held that the provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, which gave executive power to the Comptroller General, an officer of Congress, were unconstitutional as violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers. 7 2 In describing the procedural
1309, 1314 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (using President Bush's signing statement as support that Congress intended prospective enforcement of the Amendments); Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 780, 785 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same). Four of the cases use President
Bush's Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Clemmer v. Enron
Corp., 882 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (using President Bush's signing statement to
explain why the ADA took effect two years after it was passed); Aikens v. Banana Republic, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (same); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs.,
Inc., 855 F. Supp. 371, 373 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (same), affd 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996);
Raya v. Maryatt Indus., 829 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (same). Four of the cases
use President Reagan's Statement on Signing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1987. See
United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1480 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990) (using President Reagan's
signing statement as support for the Guideline's application to offenses begun before the
Guidelines went into affect and completed after); United States v. Tharp, 892 F.2d 691, 694
(8th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (same);
United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
168. See infra notes 245-60 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the use of
legislative history in general). Some signing statements, however, provide no interpretive
assistance. For example, in Comes Flying v. United States, in determining whether the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act waived the United States' sovereign immunity as to plaintiffs' tort claim, the court noted that the only legislative history
regarding the portion of the Act at issue was President Bush's signing statement wherein
he noted his "distaste" for the provision. 830 F. Supp. at 531 n.2. The court found this
legislative history little help in construing the statute. See id.
169. See Fisher, 22 F.3d at 267 (noting that the Florida Keys Act provided that the
sanctuary become designated as such on the effective date of the Act and that President
Bush's signing statement showed that the President had the same understanding of the
Act); Saleh, 962 F.2d at 238 n.6 (noting that the current asylum law, as distinguished from
the law under which the case was being decided, was enacted on November 29, 1990 by
citing President Bush's signing statement); Cowsen-el, 826 F. Supp. at 536 (citing President
Ford's signing statement in noting that the Privacy Act of 1974 was signed into law on
January 1, 1975).
170. See infra Part I.E.1 (discussing the critical response to presidential assertions of
interpretive power).
171. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
172. See id. at 736.
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history of the case, the Court noted in a footnote that President Reagan,
in his signing statement, had expressed his view that the Act was unconthe Supreme Court
stitutional.' 73 Similarly, in United States v. Lopez,
held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990175 exceeded Congress's

Commerce Clause power. 176 To support the argument that the Act was a
criminal statute unrelated to commerce, however broadly defined, the

Court in a footnote quoted President Bush's signing statement in which
he objected to the act as "inappropriately overrid[ing] legitimate state
firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law.' 17 7 Subsequently,
the Third Circuit reacted to the Supreme Court's use of the signing statement in Lopez by citing to a signing statement in United States v.
Bishop.178 In holding that the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992179 was not an
unconstitutional intrusion into the states' powers to define and enforce
the criminal law, the court, in a footnote, quoted President Bush's signing
statement praising the federalizing of the crime in reaction to the recent

epidemic of carjackings. 8 ° The court noted that it would have found
President Bush's statement "of relatively minor significance but for the
fact that the Supreme Court in Lopez specifically noted President Bush's
'
concern upon signing the Gun-Free School Zone Act." 181
173. See id. at 719 n.1. The President noted the same constitutional defect that the
court identified in reaching its decision. See id. at 736. In the per curiam district court
decision in the case, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), affid, 478 U.S. 714
(1986), which then-Judge Scalia heard, the court used President Reagan's signing statement in support of the proposition that in the event the Act was ruled unconstitutional, it
would be ruled unconstitutional in regard to the powers that had been given to the Comptroller General, rather than unconstitutional in regard to the removal provisions for the
Comptroller General, an officer of Congress. See id. at 1393 & n.22. The court noted that
in his signing statement, President Reagan had indicated that the scheme was unconstitutional since the Comptroller General as a congressional officer, could not perform executive functions. See id. President Reagan stated that he had attempted to work with the
Congress to solve this problem, but that he was unsuccessful. See id. at 1393 n.22.
174. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (making it a federal offense to knowingly possess
a firearm in a school zone). This statute was amended by Pub. L. No. 94-75, 108 Stat. 2125
(1994) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)) which set forth the relation between the offense and Congress's Commerce Clause power. See id.
176. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
177. Id. at 1631 n.3. The Fifth Circuit opinion in the same case relied on President
Bush's signing statement in the same manner. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342,
1360 (5th Cir. 1993), affid 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); accord United States v. Glover, 842 F.
Supp. 1327,1332 n.10 (D. Kan. 1994); United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450,451 (D. Kan.
1994).
178. 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (making carjacking a federal offense).
180. See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 584 n.24.
181. Id.
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Use of Signing Statements to Confirm the Reading of
. Statutory Language

Similarly non-controversial, but unnecessary, 182 is the judicial use of
signing statements to confirm its reading of statutory language. In Aikens
v. Banana Republic, Inc.,183 the court held that the Americans With Disa-

bilities Act (ADA) did not apply retroactively.

84

In support of its hold-

ing, the court first cited the statutory language which specified the
effective date of the Act.' 85 The court then turned to President Bush's
signing statement which noted that the delayed effective date would "permit adequate time for businesses to become acquainted with the ADA's
requirements and to take the necessary steps to achieve compliance." '86
The court concluded that a retroactive application of the act would defeat
87
the purpose of the delayed effective date.
c.

Signing Statements as Indicia of the Fundamental Purposes of
a Statute

In some instances, courts have used signing statements, both in conjunction with legislative history and standing alone, to understand the

fundamental purposes of a statute. For example, in Creek Nation v.
United States, 8 8 the court relied upon the legislative history of the Indian
Claim's Commission Act and the President's signing statement to con-

clude that the fundamental purpose of the Act was to provide a special
venue for Indian claims and give Indians a "fair deal.' 89 Likewise, in
182. Judge Wald argues that some uses of legislative history are "benign." Wald, supra
note 57, at 289. Judge Wald calls the following uses of legislative history benign: to make
sure that it does not contradict or undermine the court's reading; to confirm the court's
reading of statutory language; if the text is silent or ambiguous, to "shed some light on the
particular issue for decision;" if the court does not find a "specific answer," to understand
the "fundamental purposes of the act." Id. at 289-93.
183. 877 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
184. See id. at 1036.
185. The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994). The ADA did
not apply to private employers, however, until July 26, 1992. Id.
186. Aikens, 877 F. Supp. at 1036.
187. See id.; accord Clemmer v. Enron Corp., 882 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(refusing to apply the ADA retroactively based in part upon President Bush's signing statement); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., 855 F. Supp. 371, 373 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (same);
Raya v. Maryatt Indus., 829 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (same); R.G.H. v. Abbott
Lab., No. 93-C4361, 1995 WL 668830, at *8187 (N.D. II1. Feb. 16, 1995) (same).
188. 168 Ct. Cl. 483 (1964).
189. Id. at 493; see also Crowley Marine Servs. v. FEDNAV Ltd., 915 F. Supp. 218, 222
(E.D. Wash. 1995) (noting that the 1992 amendment to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act "was a clear effort on behalf of Congress to equally apply environmental
standards to private citizens and the federal government" based upon the House Committee Report on the bill and President Bush's signing statement); Grumbine v. United States,
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United States v. Yacoubian,190 the court upheld the retroactive applicabil-

ity of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990
against a constitutional challenge. 191 The court relied upon the congres-

sional conference report and upon President Bush's signing statement to

192
find the rational legislative basis for the statute.
Courts have also used their understanding of the fundamental purposes
of a statute, as described in a signing statement, to ascertain the meaning
of undefined statutory terms. In construing various undefined or ambiguous provisions in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 9 3 courts

have routinely cited President Johnson's signing statement to understand
the broad purposes and limitations of the Act. For instance, in Berry v.
Department of Justice,"' the court examined whether Berry's presentenc-

ing report and other documents were "agency records," a term which the
FOIA does not define. 1 95 Disclosure of documents pursuant to the FOIA
196
depends upon whether the documents are considered agency records.
In determining that the requested documents were agency records,' 97 the

court cited President Johnson's signing statement to demonstrate that one
of FOIA's purposes is to give the public access to the agency decisionmaking process.' 98 Similarly, in Church of Scientology of California v.
United States Department of Justice,' 99 the court examined whether confidential law enforcement investigatory information fell within one of the
586 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D.D.C. 1984) (noting that the basic purpose of the Equal Pay Act
is "to eliminate all wage discrimination based on sex" according to the statements of various members of Congress and President Kennedy's signing statement).
190. 24 F.3d 1 (9th Cir. 1994).
191. See id. at 7. Yacoubian, who had been convicted of a variety of criminal firearms
offenses in 1982, faced deportation under the 1990 Act. See id. at 2, 6-7.
192. See id. at 8.

193. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
194. 733 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1984). Berry was convicted of conspiracy to transport
money received through interstate fraud and sentenced to three years imprisonment. See
id. at 1344. He sued to get copies of his presentence investigation report, the Report on
the Sentenced Offender, and other documents from the Department of Justice, the Parole
Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See id. at 1345.
195. See id. at 1349 (discussing the court's reliance on caselaw to determine whether the
documents were agency records).
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
197. The court held that "court-generated documents are agency records if they are 1)
in the possession of an agency and 2) prepared substantially to be relied upon in agency
decisionmaking." Berry, 733 F.2d at 1349.
198. See id. In support of this conclusion, the court cited a Ninth Circuit case, the
Congressional Reports, President Johnson's signing statement, and a law review article.
See id. at 1349-50. The court did not comment on its use of the signing statement; rather, it
appears in a string cite. See id.
199. 410 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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exceptions to the FOIA. ° ° In determining that these records were exempt from disclosure, the court used President Johnson's signing statement to emphasize that the FOIA compels disclosure of all government
records that do not fall within the nine FOIA exceptions."0 '
d.

Use of Signing Statements to Define Statutory Terms

Furthermore, the courts have used signing statements in conjunction
with other legislative history to determine the meaning of an undefined
statutory term. For example, in Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz,"'2 the
court held that the standard for determining the applicability of the Fair
Labor Standard Act's good faith exception was objective rather than subjective.2 °3 The court found that the Act did not specify whether the standard was objective or subjective and that other courts had interpreted it

both ways.204 In support of its holding, the court quoted a statement in
the CongressionalRecord of one of the House managers of the bill, and
President Truman's message to Congress upon signing the bill, both of
which stated that the bill required an objective standard.20 5
Courts also have used signing statements to help interpret ambiguous

statutory language in conjunction with other pieces of legislative history.
For example, in United States v. Story,20 6 the court examined whether the
defendants should be sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines), or under pre-Guidelines law.20 7 The court found the statute

ambiguous as to whether the Guidelines applied to offenses which began
200. See id. at 1298.
201. See id. at 1300. President Johnson's signing statement asserted, "'A democracy
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be
revealed without injury to the public interest."' Id.; see also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v.
Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.18 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing President Johnson's signing statement regarding the FOIA's inapplicability to "the President's power under our Constitution to provide for confidentiality when the national interest so requires" in its discussion
of the government's release of information in response to political pressure).
202. 413 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1969).
203. See id. at 661. The Secretary of Labor brought suit to enjoin the appellant from
violating overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and to recover unpaid overtime compensation. See id. at 659-60.
204. See id. at 661.
205. See id. at 661-62 (stating that President Truman stated in his message to Congress,
"'The employer must meet an objective test of actual conformity with an administrative
ruling or policy."')
206. 891 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1989).
207. See id. at 989. The defendants had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See id. Evidence showed that the conspiracy began before the Guidelines were
enacted and was completed after the Guidelines were enacted. See id. The offense, therefore, was referred to as a "straddle" crime. See id.
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before the date the Guidelines went into effect and were completed after
that date. 08 The court noted that the bill Congress passed was a compromise bill, meaning that it was not the bill that was originally introduced in
either house, and that neither house of Congress issued a report regarding the enacted version of the bill. 0 9 The court further noted that the
Department of Justice had participated in the compromise negotiations.2 1 0 When the bill passed the House, the House Manager put a sec-

tion-by-section analysis into the Congressional Record stating that the
Guidelines would not apply to an offense begun before November 1, 1987
and completed after that date. 1 1 When the Senate adopted the same bill,
however, the Senate manager explicitly rejected this understanding, both
on behalf of the Senate and on behalf of the Department of Justice. 1 2 In
his signing statement, President Reagan agreed with the Senate's understanding, 213 and ultimately, the court adopted the understanding of the
Senate and the President. 1 4 The Court noted that the weight accorded a
presidential signing statement would vary with the circumstances, but relied upon the Justice Department's participation in the negotiation pro-

cess to justify the interpretive weight given to President Reagan's
views.21 5
208. See id. at 992. The Guidelines provided that the Act would apply to those offenses
committed after the effective date of the Act. Id. at 991.
209. See id. at 992.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 993 & n.5.
212. See id. at 993.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 994. The court justified its decision on the following grounds. First,
during the Senate consideration of the bill, the Senate's position was explicit, whereas the
conflicting view was stated in a footnote to the section-by-section analysis of the bill. See
id. Second, both the Senate and the House sought to avoid ex post facto violations, and
under current law, there would not have been an ex post facto violation for continuing
offenses. See id. Third, "[t]hough in some circumstances there is room for doubt as to the
weight to be accorded a presidential signing statement in illuminating congressional intent
...President Reagan's views are significant here because the Executive Branch participated in the negotiation of the compromise legislation." Id. Fourth, there was no rule of
lenity problem because not all sentences under the guidelines yielded a higher sentence.
See id. Finally, the result comported with the underlying congressional purpose of lessening disparity in sentencing. See id. at 994-95.
215. See id. at 994. Several courts have used the same analysis employing legislative
history and signing statement. See, e.g., United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1480 & n.2
(11th Cir. 1990) (including the signing statement in the court's analysis of the Sentencing
Act of 1987's legislative history); United States v. Tharp, 892 F.2d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 1989)
(justifying its similar reliance on the signing statement noting, "The President, after all, has
a part in the legislative process, too, except as to bills passed over his veto, and his intent
must be considered relevant to determining the meaning of a law in close cases"); United
States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing the signing statement as support
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Signing Statements Used to Resolve an Impasse

Most controversially, courts sometimes use signing statements to tip
the scale in favor one interpretation over another. In cases construing the
retroactivity of various provisions of the Civil Rights Amendments of
1991, some lower courts used President Bush's signing statement, which
weighed in on one side of an unresolved controversy, 2 16 to determine that
Congress intended certain provisions to apply prospectively, and not retroactively.2 17 The Supreme Court, however, determined that there was
no clear congressional intent and resolved the issue without relying on
the signing statement.2 18

The issue reached the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film ProdPresident Bush's signing statement, the Court deter-

ucts. 2 1 9 Ignoring

mined that Congress expressed no intent with regard to the retroactivity

except for two sections of the Act.22° Congressional intent with regard to
retroactivity was relevant both to interpret the text and to apply the default rule of statutory retroactivity. 22 1 The Court held that the provisions
at issue were not retroactive.2 22
To some lower courts, however, the legislative history revealed that the
intent of Congress was that the Act should be applied only prospectively.
For example, in McCullough v. ConsolidatedRail Corp. ,223 the court concluded that the Act should be applied prospectively even though "the
for the proposition that the Sentencing Act of 1987 is applicable to offenses begun before
and completed after the effective date).
216. See Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1504, 1504
(Nov. 21, 1991). President Bush in his signing statement adopted "the analyses of S.1745
introduced by Senator Dole on behalf of himself and several other Senators and of the
Administration" into the Congressional Record. Id. "These documents will be treated as
authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch." Id.
217. See infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
219. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
220. See id. at 262. Several sections of the Act specifically stated that they were not
retroactive. Id. at 257-63. The court noted that:
The legislative history discloses some frankly partisan statements about the meaning of the final effective date language, but those statements cannot plausibly be
read as reflecting any general agreement. The history reveals no evidence that
Members believed that an agreement had been tacitly struck on the controversial
retroactivity issue.... Instead, the history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression
that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act
would apply to preeneactment conduct.
Id. at 262-63 (footnotes omitted).
221. See id. at 267-69. For the court to find that a statute is retroactive, Congress must
"make its intention clear." Id. at 268.
222. See id. at 286.
223. 785 F. Supp. 1309 (N.D. I11.
1992). The same judge who heard McCullough decided two similar cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applying the same reasoning as
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legislative history and commentary [were] not entirely clear. '224 The
court supported its conclusion by noting that prospective application was
supported by some Congresspersons, one of the bill's sponsors, President
Bush's signing statement, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation.2 25
Other lower courts found the legislative history hopelessly ambiguous,
but then claimed to find the congressional intent to be revealed in the
legislative procedures surrounding the passage of the bill. For example,
in Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.,226 the court concluded that the procedural history of the bill meant that the bill would not have been enacted if the bill was interpreted to be retroactive.22 7 The procedural
history of the bill revealed that President Bush vetoed a similar civil
rights bill in 1990 that specifically provided for retroactivity, citing the
bill's "unfair retroactivity rules" among his reasons for the veto,2 28 and
that in the next Congress, the version of the bill that ultimately was enacted did not contain the retroactivity provision. 229 This reading implicitly gave some weight to President Bush's signing statement. A different
court rejected the Fray approach, however, in James v. American International Recovery, Inc.23 ° Concluding that the Act did not apply retroactively based on statutory retroactivity jurisprudence, the court assumed
that there was no congressional intent as to retroactivity.2 3 '

f

Signing Statements that Are Inconsistent with Congressional
Legislative History

Some courts have refused to use signing statements where they conflict
with legislative history. In Taylor v. Heckler,232 the court refused to consider a signing statement because it found the statement "largely inconsisoutlined infra in text. See Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 827, 831-35 (N.D.
I1. 1992); Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 780, 784-87 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
224. McCullough, 785 F. Supp. at 1314.

225. See id.; see also supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush's
signing statement and his adoption of Senator Dole's interpretation).
226. 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).

227. See id. at 1378. The court reasoned that since the earlier version of the bill which
mandated full retroactivity did not pass, and that the version which did pass did not provide for full retroactivity, the legislative intent in the passed version of the bill was that it

was to be applied prospectively only. See id.
228. See id. at 1375 (citation omitted).

229. See it at 1375-76. The House version of the bill contained the same retroactivity
provisions as the vetoed bill, but they were deleted in the Senate bill, which was the version
that ultimately passed both Houses and President Bush signed. See id.
230. 799 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ga. 1992).

231. See id. at 1197-98.
232. 835 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1988)
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tent with the legislative history., 233 At issue in Taylor was the meaning
of the phrase "substantially justified" in the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA).2 34 Under the EAJA, a prevailing party may be reimbursed

"reasonable fees and costs incurred in any non-tort civil action against the

United States 'unless the court finds that the position of the United States
was substantially justified.' ' 235 In his signing statement, President Rea-

gan had asserted that the substantial justification standard was a relatively low standard. 236 The court held that President Reagan's
interpretation was inconsistent with the legislative history.23 7 The court

specifically refused to consider whether a presidential signing statement
deserves to be accorded any weight in its statutory interpretation.238
g. When the Court Just Says No: Signing Statements Ignored
Other courts have simply refused to use signing statements at all. In
Caruth v. United States,239 the court supported its holding regarding an
income tax issue with an extensive exposition of the legislative history of
a provision of the tax code, beginning with the enactment of the provision
in 1918, and tracing the various amendments to the Act.2 4 ° At the end,
the court noted that its exposition of the legislative history did not give

any weight to the presidential signing statement.241
233. Id. at 1044 n.17; see also Hadden v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 679, 685 (D. Utah 1986)
(refusing to give weight to President Reagan's signing statement regarding the meaning of
"substantially justified" noting, "The remarks of a few legislators, and even the President,
cannot change the clear intent of the entire Congress").
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
235. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. It 1985)). An administrative law
judge denied Taylor's request for social security disability benefits. See id. After exhausting her administrative appeals, Taylor appealed to district court and was granted summary
judgement. See id.
236. See Statement on Signing the Bill Extending the Equal Access to Justice Act, 2
PUB. PAPERS

977 (Aug. 5, 1985). President Reagan stated:

[Ilt is my understanding in signing this bill that the Congress recognized the important distinction between the substantial justification standard in the fee proceeding and a court's finding on the merits that an agency action was arbitrary
and capricious or not supported by substantial evidence. The substantial justification standard is a different standard, and an easier one to meet, than either the
arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence standard.
Id.
237. See Taylor, 835 F.2d at 1042-44.
238. See id. at 1044 n.17.
239. 688 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
240. Id. at 1142-1146. The court provided this appendix to its opinion which consists of
its description of the legislative history of the original Act and the amendments to it. See
id.
241. See id. at 1146 n.ll.
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WHY AND

How

COURTS SHOULD USE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING

STATEMENTS WHEN INTERPRETING FEDERAL STATUTES

A.

Signing Statements Are Constitutionally Relevant

Signing statements can provide the same assistance and are subject to
the same abuses, by both the Presidents who issue them and the courts
that rely upon them, as legislative history.2 42 Because the President's
constitutional role in legislating has grown along with the scope and
number of federal statutes, his view should, under certain circumstances,
be accorded significant consideration by the courts.243 Signing statements, as much as legislative history, are a constitutionally permissible
244
extrinsic aid to interpreting statutes.
In advocating the interpretive value of presidential signing statements,
it is necessary to confront the fact that the interpretive value of legislative
history itself in statutory construction has come under increasing scrutiny. 245 This criticism has had some effect, as reflected in the Supreme
Court's decreased use of legislative history in recent years. 246 Critics of

legislative history make two basic arguments, one theoretical and the
other practical. The first criticism is that legislative history is an invalid
source for interpretation because it is not subject to the bicameralism and
242. See infra notes 245-60 and accompanying text (discussing the recent criticism of
the use legislative history in general).
243. See supra Parts I.A, I.B (describing the President's legislative role).
244. See infra part I.A.2. (adopting a separation of powers model in which presidential
signing statements can be accorded interpretive weight).
245. There always have been detractors of the use of legislative history. See United
States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295 (1953). Justice Jackson, in criticizing the use
of legislative history, argued that divining legislative intent through legislative history is
"not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute." Id. at 319 (Jackson, J. concurring). Justice Scalia, a vocal modem-day advocate of the irrelevance of extra-textual interpretive aids, argued "that the only legitimate source for interpretive guidance is the
statutory text at issue, the structure of the statute as a whole, or other related provisions of
statutory law." Zeppos, supra note 72, at 1296. But see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing between the use of legislative history in general and its use to avoid an absurd result); cf. Killenbeck, supra note
150, at 247 (arguing that Scalia "presents no textual warrant for refusing to examine legislative history where such material provides essential context for resolving genuine ambiguities or avoiding patently absurd results"). The appointment to the Supreme Court of
Justice Breyer, a leading advocate of the careful use of legislative history, may, however,
counter this retreat. See generally Breyer, supra note 68.
246. See Breyer, supra note 68, at 846. Then-Judge Breyer notes that although in 1981,
"the Supreme Court relied on legislative history in almost every statutory case it decided,"
the Court's use has decreased to 55 out of 65 statutory cases in 1989, and 36 out of 55
statutory cases in 1990. See id. (citing Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 197, 288, 298
(1983)).
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presentment requirements of the Constitution.2 47 This argument could
be applied similarly to signing statements. The answer to both objections
is that neither legislative history nor signing statements are equivalent to
the law.248 Rather, when faced with an ambiguity or unanswered question, legislative history and signing statements can express the "will" of
Congress and the President.249
The second criticism is that as a result of the manner in which legislative history is created, it is not a reliable indicator of legislative intent
because legislators as well as aides can "plant" legislative history which is

intended to influence judicial interpretation.25 ° The corollary of this criticism in the signing statement context is that a President who chooses to
sign a measure with which he disagrees can, through his signing statement, attempt to alter the effect of the legislation.251 The answer to this
criticism is that the unreliable nature of some legislative history and some
signing statements does not justify a per se rule against using them. 252

Rather, as with legislative history, the reliability of the signing statements
must be assessed through an understanding of the different situations in
which the President issues them.
Defenders of the use of legislative history argue that judges need to be
aware of the ways in which legislative history can be abused, but that they
247. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 776-77 (citing
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Judge Wald
argues that what underlies this criticism is that Congress speaks constitutionally only
through enacted statutes, "not through any supplementary explanation thereof." Wald,
supra note 57, at 285. But see Starr, supra note 56, at 375. Judge Starr suggests that floor
speeches are the only legislative history which is even "minimally probative" of congressional intent, because they are the only pieces of legislative history which more members
can be considered to have even heard or read. See id.; cf. Wald, supra note 57, at 306-07.
Judge Wald's response to this criticism is that it "denies legitimacy to all materials, even
statutes, that have not been personally read by all the members of a Congress." Id at 307.
The ramifications of this position are severe, because "few would deny at this late date that
the typical representative votes on a complex statutory scheme without reading either the
full bill or the legislative history." Id.
248. See Breyer, supra note 68, at 863 ("No one claims that legislative history is a statute, or even that, in any strong sense, it is law.").
249. See Wald, supra note 57, at 306.
250. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 777; see also Starr, supra note 56, at 376-77.
Related to this concern is the cost to litigators and nonlitigators of obtaining and analyzing
legislative history. See id. at 377-78. Historically, there was a similar concern that legislative history and signing statements were not generally available. This information, however, is now widely available in print in U.S.C.C.A.N., the Weekly Compilation of
PresidentialDocuments, the Public Papers of the Presidents,as well as on-line on Westlaw
and LEXIS.
251. See Cross, supra note 9, at 222-23.
252. See supra notes 165-238 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions that
have considered either legislative history or signing statements).
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should not disregard it altogether.25 3 Indeed, a complete disregard of leg-

islative history might itself raise constitutional questions because "legislative history is the authoritative product of the institutional work of the
Congress., 254 Former Chief Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and former White House Coun25 6
sel Abner Mikva 2 5 suggests that legislative history be used carefully.
Careful use requires courts to resort to legislative history only when the
statutory language is unclear, except when apparently clear language
would lead to an absurd result.25 7 In addition, careful use of legislative
history requires "a judicial understanding of the legislative process and a
good-faith attempt on the part of the courts to choose legislative history
that is most probative of legislative intent, not legislative history that supports their views. '258 Finally, Judge Mikva advocates that courts "leave
alone" situations in which the ambiguity in the statute is a result of a
genuinely unresolved policy 259 such as was the case in the retroactivity of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act.260
253. See Breyer, supra note 68, at 847.
254. Wald, supra note 57, at 306. Judge Wald continues:
To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional understanding because we are suspicious that nefarious staffers have planted certain information
for some undisclosed reason, is to second-guess Congress' chosen form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own
constitutional functions effectively. It comes perilously close, in my view, to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations and, in that sense,
runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of powers
principle.
Id. at 306-07.
255. Judge Mikva's opinion is especially interesting because he has served in all three
branches of the federal government. Judge Mikva served as a Congressman from Illinios
for five terms. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at xxxi. Appointed to the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit by President Carter, Judge Mikva
served from 1979 to 1994. See WHO'S WHO INAMERICAN LAW: 1996-1997 528 (9th ed.
1996). Most recently, Judge Mikva served as President Clinton's White House Counsel
from 1994 to 1996. See id.
256. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 58, at 780. Judge Mikva suggests the following
hierarchy of legislative history as probative of legislative intent: committee and conference
reports; markup transcripts; committee debate and hearing transcripts; and transcripts of
actual floor debate. See id. at 782. Judge Mikva recommends disregarding the following:
floor statements that are not a part of the debate; statements later inserted in the Congressional Record; and amendments that were rejected during the enactment process. See id.
at 782-83.
257. See id. at 781.
258. Judge Mikva defines legislative history which reveals legislative intent as history
which "bear[s] a significant relationship to the enactment process." Id. at 782.
259. See Mikva, supra note 65, at 382.
260. See supra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (discussing court use of President
Bush's signing statement).
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When and How Courts Should Use Signing Statements

As legislative history in general is useful in some situations and subject
to abuse in others, so too are signing statements. There are three principles which should guide judicial use of signing statements. First, signing
statements should be considered when the statute is ambiguous. Second,
signing statements should be used only when they are reliable. Third,
courts should justify their reliance on signing statements.
There are four situations in which a President is likely to issue an interpretive signing statement, all of which may encompass executive instructions to administrative agencies. In the first scenario, the President
recommends the legislation but is not actively involved in the legislative
process; upon signing the law he makes a statement regarding the meaning of the law. In the second situation, the President recommends the
legislation, is actively involved in compromises necessary for the passage
of the bill and upon signing the law makes a statement regarding its
meaning. The third situation involves a statute that is purposefully ambiguous as a result of an unresolved policy conflict, and the President
issues a signing statement in which he interprets the ambiguous provision.
Finally, in the fourth situation, the President is opposed to the bill but
signs it anyway, issuing a signing statement in which he interprets a provision with which he disagrees.
1.

Signing Statements Should Be Used Only When the Statute
Is Ambiguous

In Aikens v. Banana Republic, Inc.,26a the court used a signing statement to confirm its reading of statutory language. z62 This was an unnecessary use of a signing statement because the statute named the exact
effective date of the act. 263 Although this use could be defended as benign, the careful and therefore restrained use of legislative history counsels against such use.
2. Signing Statements Should Be Reliable Indicators of
CongressionalIntent
Signing statements are reliable when they give effect to congressional
intent. To determine whether a signing statement is reliable, the court
should look to the context in which the statement was made. Because a
functional understanding of the legislative process reveals that the President has a role in negotiating legislative compromises and suggesting the
261. 877 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
262. See id. at 1036.
263. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3), (a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(B) (1994).

1997]

PresidentialSigning Statements

substantive scope of legislation, signing statements are most reliable
when Congress adopts the executive purpose as its own. In these situations, signing statements can aid a court in interpreting a statute where
the statement clarifies an issue on which the legislative history is silent or
augments the existing legislative history. Signing statements are least
helpful when they conflict with the reliable legislative history or when
they appear to resolve a conflict on which the Congress either could not
agree or agreed to disagree.
In United States v. Story,264 the court's reliance on a signing statement
to help interpret an ambiguous provision of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines gave effect to congressional intent, thus demonstrating the
proper use of a signing statement. In Story, the available legislative history was not entirely reliable.26 5 There were no committee reports regarding the bill, and the legislative history consisted of two items: a
section-by-section analysis that the House manager of the bill placed in
the CongressionalRecord, and a statement opposing the House manager's analysis that the Senate manager of the bill placed in the Congressional Record.2 66 The court relied upon President Reagan's signing
statement, along with other justifications, to support its adoption of the
Senate rather than the House version of the bill.26 7 The court justified its
use of the signing statement by noting the executive branch participation
in negotiating the compromise bill.26 8 The court did not use the signing
statement to tip the balance of competing congressional interpretations in
favor of one interpretation over another. Rather, the court used the signing statement to determine the weight the House manager's statement
should be given. The signing statement thus was a reliable indicator of
congressional intent.
Some lower court decisions regarding the Civil Rights Amendments of
1991 provide examples of an improper use of signing statements. In those
cases, courts used a signing statement to tip the balance of competing
congressional interpretations in favor of one interpretation over another. 269 As the Supreme Court noted when it resolved the issue, there
was no clear congressional intent.27 ° Therefore, the signing statement
264. 891F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1989).
265. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text (discussing which pieces of legislative history are most probative of congressional intent).
266. See Story, 891 F.2d at 993.
267. See id. at 994.
268. See id.
269. See supra notes 216-31 and accompanying text.
270. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S 244, 263 (1994).
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should not have been used to adopt one competing congressional interpretation over another.
As a corollary, it is proper for courts to refuse to use signing statements
that conflict with legislative history. In Taylor v. Heckler, the court refused to consider a signing statement
it found to be "largely inconsistent
271
with the legislative history."

3.

Courts Should Justify Their Reliance Upon a Signing Statement

In Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, the court used the signing statement to determine the meaning of a term that was not defined in the
statute.272 It is impossible to determine from the opinion whether the
President's statement is reliable. The opinion does not mention whether
the President had any role in the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act, but
it does mention that the author of the legislative history to which the
opinion refers was the House manager of the bill and a member of the
Conference Committee.273 Such legislative history is at the pinnacle of
the Mikva hierarchy of reliability. 274 Reliable legislative history which

agrees with a signing statement supports the reliability of the signing
statement, but it would have been preferable for the court to have mentioned its justification for using the signing statement.275
In the FOIA cases, courts have routinely cited to President Johnson's
signing statement to understand the broad purposes and limitations of the
Act to construe undefined and ambiguous terms.27 6 Although the courts'
use of the signing statement appears to give effect to congressional intent,
courts should justify their reliance upon the statement.
For the most part, the courts are choosing the proper course. Courts
have used signing statements to interpret ambiguous or unclear statutory
provisions without allowing the signing statement to count as a vote in
favor of one policy preference over another. Courts have refused to use
signing statements that were inconsistent with statutory language or legislative history. In general, courts need to be more explicit as to why they
rely on signing statements.
271. 835 F.2d 1037, 1044 n.17 (3d Cir. 1987).
272. 413 F.2d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1969).
273. See id.

274. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text (discussing which pieces of legislative history are most probative of congressional intent).
275. But see Cross, supra note 9, at 234-38 (discussing when judicial deference to presidential signing statements is appropriate).
276. See supra notes 182-87 (discussing courts' use of President Johnson's signing statement to construe various undefined or ambiguous provisions in the FOIA).
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III.

521

CONCLUSION

What were once ceremonial signing statements have become substantive assertions of the President's legislative role, presenting new challenges and opportunities to the courts. Because Presidents play an
integral role in the legislative process, courts should consider signing
statements along with legislative history when construing ambiguous statutory language or a statute that does not on its face answer the question
presented. Judicial use of signing statements, however, should be limited
to situations in which the signing statement is a reliable indicator of congressional intent. Courts can ensure that the signing statement is reliable
by justifying their use of it according to the criteria suggested in this
Comment.
Kristy L. Carroll

